A possible world in which nothing exists?

[blowfly]

Hey Meta - I've been hashing this out on a few other forums. Interested in your response, as it seems relevant to some of your arguments, and potentially damaging to the relevance of modal logic. From memory, you've said something like "nothing, as a putative state of affairs, is impossible" - I argue that it is possible, from the possible-worlds perspective.

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I believe there exists a possible world in which nothing exists, ie. this possible world contains no contradiction. If we compiled a set of existent entities within this world, it would be the empty set.

The usual objections to this are:

* "Nothingness would still exist!" No, this is just reifying "nothing", a simple linguistic fallacy.

* "How can something be true of this world if this world does not exist - surely that something was true of it would be an existent element of this world?" No, the idea of this possible world does exist, and the assertions we make about the possible world do exist: within ours head, in the actual world. These ideas and assertions do not exist within the possible world itself, only the actual world we are imagining and asserting them in.

* "Truths such as A=A are true in every world." No, propositions do not even exist in possible worlds which lack proposition-handling-apparati ie. cognizers. Therefore it is not true to say that the proposition "A=A" has any existence (let along any properties, such as "being true") in the possible world in which nothing exists. (Or any possible worlds in which no cognizers exist.)

* "The world may contain nothing, but the world itself would exist". This is an unfortunate side effect of the terminology used in the possible worlds framework. Rather that saying that this possible world stipulates "the world contains nothing (but the world itself exists)", it is more accurate to say "the state of affairs is such that nothing exists".

Assuming there is no logical contradiction to be found within the idea of a possible world in which nothing exists, this would imply that everything which does exist, exists contingently. (Ie. for every existent X, there exists a possible world in which X is non-existent.) The two most important implications are:

1) If God exists, he exists contingently. If we couple this with the premise "If God exists, he exists necessarily" then this logically implies the non-existence of God.

2) Much of modal logic becomes irrelevant, as the significance of the necessity operator [ ] is significantly undermined. At most, it could be used negatively to designate propositions with internet contradiction ("necessarily, there are no square circles"), but cannot accurately be used in a positive way.

Cheers,
-the possibly-worldly blowfly

P.S. p/f tells me there is a grammatical error here... though try as I might this appears to be a possible post in which no grammatical errors exist...

[Gwarlroge]

Blowfly! You're back!

I'll maybe read the post later; I just had to say Hi.

[ZAROVE]

Isn’t it odd that someone in a world in which things exists, and who exists themselves, would postulate a world in which nothing existed? By your own existence, though, we know that something must exist.

[blowfly]

Blowfly! You're back!

I'll maybe read the post later; I just had to say Hi.

G'day

Most post at CARM and forums.philosophforums.com now, but I'm interested in Meta's response to this argument as it's quite relevant to some of his other arguments.

[blowfly]

Isn’t it odd that someone in a world in which things exists, and who exists themselves, would postulate a world in which nothing existed? By your own existence, though, we know that something must exist.

Sure. We know that stuff does exist, from which we can conclude that the possible world in which nothing exists, is not the actual world. However the whole point of the possible worlds framework is to explore other possible states of affairs, to distinguish between what is necessarily the case and what is contingently the case.

Another example: I can conceive of a possible world such that I do not exist. However this is entirely compatible with cogito ergo sum. The possible world establishes that at most my existence could be contingently true, while cogito ergo sum establishes my existence as actually true - entirley compatible.

[ZAROVE]

I was making a rather obscure Joke.

[blowfly]

I was making a rather obscure Joke.

Hmm... I heard that wooshing sound again... :p

[Metacrock]

Hey Meta - I've been hashing this out on a few other forums. Interested in your response, as it seems relevant to some of your arguments, and potentially damaging to the relevance of modal logic. From memory, you've said something like "nothing, as a putative state of affairs, is impossible" - I argue that it is possible, from the possible-worlds perspective.

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I believe there exists a possible world in which nothing exists, ie. this possible world contains no contradiction. If we compiled a set of existent entities within this world, it would be the empty set.

The problem is you are not distinguishing between
(1)a world of nothingness, where "nothing" means physical things

(2) a world in which "nothingness exists," and

(3)"Nothingness as a putative state of affairs."

(4) Nothingness means anything at all including God.

IN the case of 4 that would be impossible. To prove that it is impossible you must prove There is no God. good luck.

I live in a world where nothingness exists already. It's not the only thing but it does exist. So that's possible but trivial it doesn't change the God talk situation.

the world where nothingness possible as a possible world. Sure. no problem. But it would not become anything.The point I have made is that nothingness cannot be a putative state of affairs. that means it can't be the starting point of a world that contains things.

You can have a world of nothing but that's all it will ever be. That means you can't use that argument to prove that our world began form nothing.

The usual objections to this are:

* "Nothingness would still exist!" No, this is just reifying "nothing", a simple linguistic fallacy.

Meaningless verbiage. Nothing is not reifying it's a real problem, If there is nothing then there is no becoming; no cause and potential.

* "How can something be true of this world if this world does not exist - surely that something was true of it would be an existent element of this world?" No, the idea of this possible world does exist, and the assertions we make about the possible world do exist: within ours head, in the actual world. These ideas and assertions do not exist within the possible world itself, only the actual world we are imagining and asserting them in.

a possible world of nothing is no problem because it wouldn't become anything. You might try to argue that Nothing means no God and thus God would not exist in a possible world. To pull that off you are crossing categories in logic like crazy so actually a world of nothing is impossible.

God is a certainty you can't make God cease by playing stupid game with arguments you don't understand. To say "nothing" you are just evoking a language game. If nothing includes God then it' impossible.

* "Truths such as A=A are true in every world." No, propositions do not even exist in possible worlds which lack proposition-handling-apparati ie. cognizers. Therefore it is not true to say that the proposition "A=A" has any existence (let along any properties, such as "being true") in the possible world in which nothing exists. (Or any possible worlds in which no cognizers exist.)

Your arguing in a circle. You haven't demonstrated that a world where nothing exists, where "nothing" includes God, is possible. Just saying it is does not make it so.

It is clearly demonstrated that God has to exist I'll show you that in minute in another thread.

* "The world may contain nothing, but the world itself would exist". This is an unfortunate side effect of the terminology used in the possible worlds framework. Rather that saying that this possible world stipulates "the world contains nothing (but the world itself exists)", it is more accurate to say "the state of affairs is such that nothing exists".

There's no reason why the term "world" implies something anymore than "state of affairs does." If there is is true absolute nothing (including no God) there is no state of affairs anymore than there would be a world. You have still done nothing to demosntae that i's a possible world. Something is not a possible world just because you say it is.

I asked Plantinga this: If you postulate a possible world in which square circles exist, but we know that square circles are an inherent contradiction in logic is that a possible world? NO is the answer. It's not possible so it's not a possible world.

It is not possible that there is no God. it 's not possible that there is absolute nothing as a putative state of affairs. It's not possible that there is a world of total absolute nothing.

something does not become a possible world just because you propose it's possibility.

Assuming there is no logical contradiction to be found within the idea of a possible world in which nothing exists, this would imply that everything which does exist, exists contingently. (Ie. for every existent X, there exists a possible world in which X is non-existent.) The two most important implications are:

there is a logical contradiction, several.

(1) Can't be a state of affairs because a state of affairs is soemthing (what's an affair?)

(2) Can't be world of no God because God is necessary to reality.

(3) God is possible in all possible worlds because God is the basis of all reality. Thus the idea of a world of total absolute nothing that includes God as nothing is definition not a possible world.

1) If God exists, he exists contingently. If we couple this with the premise "If God exists, he exists necessarily" then this logically implies the non-existence of God.

if pigs had wings they could fly. If square circles weren't impossible we could have some square circles.

God is not contingent. That's a given. God is not contingent in the sense that A is not non A.

2) Much of modal logic becomes irrelevant, as the significance of the necessity operator [ ] is significantly undermined. At most, it could be used negatively to designate propositions with internet contradiction ("necessarily, there are no square circles"), but cannot accurately be used in a positive way.

that is a ludicrous arbitrary pronouncement.

you can't make a possible world just by stipulating that something is possible.

Cheers,
-the possibly-worldly blowfly

P.S. p/f tells me there is a grammatical error here... though try as I might this appears to be a possible post in which no grammatical errors exist...

that's the least of its troubles.

[Metacrock]

God is not possible. This is because by definition God can't be such that he could cease or fail to exist. He's not dependent upon anything else for existence, and he can't cease or fail to exist. Thus God is not contingent and can't be merely "possible."

God can't be Impossible There is no logical contradiction in the concept of God. Thus he can't be impossible.

Since God can't be impossible or possible all that leaves is necessary.

god is necessary and therefore, must exist.

[Metacrock]

Isn’t it odd that someone in a world in which things exists, and who exists themselves, would postulate a world in which nothing existed? By your own existence, though, we know that something must exist.

Sure. We know that stuff does exist, from which we can conclude that the possible world in which nothing exists, is not the actual world. However the whole point of the possible worlds framework is to explore other possible states of affairs, to distinguish between what is necessarily the case and what is contingently the case.

Another example: I can conceive of a possible world such that I do not exist. However this is entirely compatible with cogito ergo sum. The possible world establishes that at most my existence could be contingently true, while cogito ergo sum establishes my existence as actually true - entirley compatible.

something is not a possible state of affairs just because you want it to be. IF it is logically impossible or even empirically impossible given the rules of that possible senerio then it's not a possible world.