Objective morality
Posted: Sun Apr 15, 2012 7:53 pm
Hi all,
I thought it would be good to start a separate thread on this topic. While it’s not a popular opinion that thinking well is the “catch-all” condition of morality and that everything else is just details, this seems to me to be it’s real essence. In fact, I consider it an “epiphany” of mine, so I’m eager to get someone to discuss it with me. Why is this wrong? Why is it offensive? I cannot seem to get past this point. It comes down to the difference between doing what is right and thinking you are doing what is right while being innocently mistaken.
1. For this discussion, let’s define “rational being” as a conscious volitional acting being with the ability to form categories and concepts of the way reality is for the purpose of guiding choices and actions.
2. Let’s define “objective moral ought” as those actions that a rational being ought to do. They are a consequence of the conditions of reality, including their nature as organisms and as rational beings.
3. A moral action requires that it be consistent with an objective moral ought and that it be intentional.
4. Rational beings are not always rational. Moral oughts that we fail to act upon out of irrationality, biases, ignorance, etc. are still objective and valid in spite of that fact.
5. Since thinking, reasoning well (i.e. arriving at judgments with a sufficiently high probability of comporting with reality) is a primary requirement for realizing intended objectives of any kind, thinking, reasoning well is the rational being’s first and foremost objective moral ought.
6. Objective moral actions entail future beneficial results of those actions, not “intrinsic goodness,” since goodness that we act to obtain is only coherent when some future benefit has the potential of being realized by the organism.
7. As a rational being wondering (in a philosophical since) what to do, the benefits motivating that being to act are with respect to him/herself as the actor, not “the good of society.” Society benefits from that being’s moral action because it is first and foremost beneficial to that being. Morality is therefore rooted in rational self interest, not society’s interest. Society is not the one willing and acting, rational beings are.
8. Rational beings can be grouped into two categories:
a. Those that stand to benefit and who therefore ought to prefer to live and thrive because it is in their nature as an organism qua organism (most people are of this category).
b. Those that do not stand to benefit (that relatively small category of people who’s quality of life is gone with little possibility of returning).
9. While objective moral oughts apply to both, they differ greatly depending on the category, and since the latter category is rather small and the corresponding list of oughts rather short, objective moral oughts are generally viewed as pertaining to the former category.
10. Since self benefit is the proper basis for objective morality, and since the life of the rational being is the context from which that benefit is measured, and since that benefit will lose context if the beneficiary’s life ceases to exist, the rational being’s life is therefore at bottom as his/her deepest value.
11. Rational beings generally benefit more from harmonious rights reciprocity, living in accord, and exchanging value for value than by stealing and preying on one another.
12. Given our lack of omniscience, we typically have to base choices and actions on our greatest probability for obtaining benefit. Harmonious rights reciprocity is one.
13. It follows then that in a social context, we ought to act in harmonious ways and we ought not act in predatory ways.
Once we get agreement on these more general facts about morality we can move to more particular fact about morality (life boat ethics, ethics from authority, etc.).
Rob
I thought it would be good to start a separate thread on this topic. While it’s not a popular opinion that thinking well is the “catch-all” condition of morality and that everything else is just details, this seems to me to be it’s real essence. In fact, I consider it an “epiphany” of mine, so I’m eager to get someone to discuss it with me. Why is this wrong? Why is it offensive? I cannot seem to get past this point. It comes down to the difference between doing what is right and thinking you are doing what is right while being innocently mistaken.
1. For this discussion, let’s define “rational being” as a conscious volitional acting being with the ability to form categories and concepts of the way reality is for the purpose of guiding choices and actions.
2. Let’s define “objective moral ought” as those actions that a rational being ought to do. They are a consequence of the conditions of reality, including their nature as organisms and as rational beings.
3. A moral action requires that it be consistent with an objective moral ought and that it be intentional.
4. Rational beings are not always rational. Moral oughts that we fail to act upon out of irrationality, biases, ignorance, etc. are still objective and valid in spite of that fact.
5. Since thinking, reasoning well (i.e. arriving at judgments with a sufficiently high probability of comporting with reality) is a primary requirement for realizing intended objectives of any kind, thinking, reasoning well is the rational being’s first and foremost objective moral ought.
6. Objective moral actions entail future beneficial results of those actions, not “intrinsic goodness,” since goodness that we act to obtain is only coherent when some future benefit has the potential of being realized by the organism.
7. As a rational being wondering (in a philosophical since) what to do, the benefits motivating that being to act are with respect to him/herself as the actor, not “the good of society.” Society benefits from that being’s moral action because it is first and foremost beneficial to that being. Morality is therefore rooted in rational self interest, not society’s interest. Society is not the one willing and acting, rational beings are.
8. Rational beings can be grouped into two categories:
a. Those that stand to benefit and who therefore ought to prefer to live and thrive because it is in their nature as an organism qua organism (most people are of this category).
b. Those that do not stand to benefit (that relatively small category of people who’s quality of life is gone with little possibility of returning).
9. While objective moral oughts apply to both, they differ greatly depending on the category, and since the latter category is rather small and the corresponding list of oughts rather short, objective moral oughts are generally viewed as pertaining to the former category.
10. Since self benefit is the proper basis for objective morality, and since the life of the rational being is the context from which that benefit is measured, and since that benefit will lose context if the beneficiary’s life ceases to exist, the rational being’s life is therefore at bottom as his/her deepest value.
11. Rational beings generally benefit more from harmonious rights reciprocity, living in accord, and exchanging value for value than by stealing and preying on one another.
12. Given our lack of omniscience, we typically have to base choices and actions on our greatest probability for obtaining benefit. Harmonious rights reciprocity is one.
13. It follows then that in a social context, we ought to act in harmonious ways and we ought not act in predatory ways.
Once we get agreement on these more general facts about morality we can move to more particular fact about morality (life boat ethics, ethics from authority, etc.).
Rob