Objective morality

[Metacrock]

you have not done anything to turn an is into an ought. you never will. it can't be done. The only thing that makes' an ought is value. you can't derive values form genetics. you can say the preference of a value is encoded in genetics. That doesn't' prove it automatically becomes a ought. There are a lot of "ought nots" that are also encoded in genes. there is a gene for alcoholism. So I can say "we should be alcoholics. we have a gene that says we should" you can 'but that's destructive" well know do you get to the point where you say the greater value is non destructive?

Let's see if I can at least get close. To quote MacIntyre

But do we have evidence for such a change of meaning? To answer this question it is helpful to consider another type of counter-example to the "No-ought" conclusions from "is" premises' thesis. From such practical premises as "This watch is grossly inaccurate and irregular in time keeping" and "This watch is too heavy to carry around comfortably', the evaluative conclusion validly follows that "This is a bad watch". From such factual premises such as "He gets a better yield for this crop per acre than any than any farmer in the district", . . .. the evaluative conclusion is that "He is a good farmer." Both of these arguments are valid because of the special character of the concepts of a watch and farmer. Such concepts are functional concepts. . . . .

So while the is-ought problem is still useful, there are still loopholes in is for things with a function behind them. If there is an inherent function to humanity, then there can be something of a definition for a "good man." So to speak. I don't think he is against the is-ought problem, just that he believes there are natural exceptions to it in terms of values.

Yes but we are still with no real clue as to how moral thinking should proceed. It's kind of a paint by numbers deal with bio ethics. do the scinece, there is the urge so it must be moral. Usually that taps out to the assumptions are not considered by an un self-aware bio ethics guy who just assumes "gee everyone shares the value of greatest good for the greatest number."

we see that with Harris's writing. He doesn't even bother to give a surface formality to consideration of the values of util he just employs it as though "that's the goal of everyone. isn't' it?

[met]

I agree with Meta. Every attempt like that always seems to end by trying to replace the 'ought's with some other word - like 'purpose' or 'nature' - but in an obfuscating sort of way. Hume was very astute on this point and it seems clear to me that the 'is-es' and 'oughts'still remain distinct categories, if you just think it over for a minute.

(ie There's no reason our built-in purposes or natures, even if those things really exist, "should" be followed. Just as likely that they "should" be overcome. )

[mdsimpson92]

Yes but we are still with no real clue as to how moral thinking should proceed. It's kind of a paint by numbers deal with bio ethics. do the scinece, there is the urge so it must be moral. Usually that taps out to the assumptions are not considered by an un self-aware bio ethics guy who just assumes "gee everyone shares the value of greatest good for the greatest number."we see that with Harris's writing. He doesn't even bother to give a surface formality to consideration of the values of util he just employs it as though "that's the goal of everyone. isn't' it?

I don't think it is quite the same though I get your point. Mine was that we do sometime get moral imperatives given by our social roles. In that sense I have created an ought from an is. The problem comes when trying to make a universal law out of it as farming obviously doesn't have quite the universal application as things like "Do not kill" etc.

[Metacrock]

I think you and Met both have excellent points.

[mdsimpson92]

I will do a little more reading from MacIntyre, but have we agreed that to a limited degree as ought can come from an is?

[Metacrock]

this was replication.

[Metacrock]

I will do a little more reading from MacIntyre, but have we agreed that to a limited degree as ought can come from an is?

I didn't say that. I said any sort of ethical thinking contains an implied ought. It doesn't come from an understanding of "is" or of nature. It comes from the implication of what "should be done" that's wrapped up in any kind valuation upon human action.

A purely aesthetic ethics like Neitzshe's still implies an ought: one ought to think aesthetically. That can't be gleaned just from looking at nature. You look at a sunset and think "that's beautiful" that's a valuation that does come embodied in the sun set. It's in us. The sun set doesn't have a little label on it that says "this is pretty." That implies "one should think this is beautiful."

[mdsimpson92]

Understood. I will do a little more reading from MacIntyre. Though again, I generally agree with the principle, especially with regards to most forms of utilitarianism. That being said, are there forms that get around this problem.

[mdsimpson92]

Understood. I will do a little more reading from MacIntyre. Though again, I generally agree with the principle, especially with regards to most forms of utilitarianism. That being said, are there forms that get around this problem?

[Metacrock]

ok that's cool. I'm beginning work on the chapter on bio ethics in the book I'm working on. So I have to focus on E.O. Wilson now.