John Rawl: Veil of Ignorance

[mdsimpson92]

Does it even make sense? John Rawls created the idea that under the veil of ignorance, society would create the fairest society. Under this, no one would know what their standing in society would be. Not their age, gender, religion, wealth etc and would form their social contract by acting in their own self interest.

The question I have to ask is if that even makes sense in a hypothetical situation. Much of our identity and how we even think is dependent on those important contexts. Furthermore, there are situations where we do act outside our own rational self interest, like children. I have heard the criticism that the veil of ignorance atomizes the individual and removes much of the important context that defines us. Things like parents, children etc. It is impossible to have a blank human slate, even hypothetically. With that said, can the veil still work as a groundwork for Rawls' other conclusions?

[Jim B.]

Does it even make sense? John Rawls created the idea that under the veil of ignorance, society would create the fairest society. Under this, no one would know what their standing in society would be. Not their age, gender, religion, wealth etc and would form their social contract by acting in their own self interest.

The question I have to ask is if that even makes sense in a hypothetical situation. Much of our identity and how we even think is dependent on those important contexts. Furthermore, there are situations where we do act outside our own rational self interest, like children. I have heard the criticism that the veil of ignorance atomizes the individual and removes much of the important context that defines us. Things like parents, children etc. It is impossible to have a blank human slate, even hypothetically. With that said, can the veil still work as a groundwork for Rawls' other conclusions?

I think of Rawls's principle of 'justice as fairness' as a moral principle. It's a way to reconcile freedom and equality in a liberal democracy. The veil screens out morally arbitrary factors that are irrelevant to justice. In the Original Position, each person is represented only as a free and equal citizen. So how do we get from there to a set of principles that all reasonable citizens would freely endorse, so that they're all equal stakeholders in a just society, not partisans competing for claims to the greatest average utility?

I agree that a lot of our identity is shaped by these other factors like age, race, etc, but these factors are morally irrelevant. You could make the same argument against morality as you're making against the veil. You could argue that morality can't be universal and categorical because each person is unique. We have to abstract from those unique features to features we all share in order to be moral agents, just like we do ( maybe to a greater extent) when we do physics or math.

[mdsimpson92]

I think of Rawls's principle of 'justice as fairness' as a moral principle. It's a way to reconcile freedom and equality in a liberal democracy. The veil screens out morally arbitrary factors that are irrelevant to justice. In the Original Position, each person is represented only as a free and equal citizen. So how do we get from there to a set of principles that all reasonable citizens would freely endorse, so that they're all equal stakeholders in a just society, not partisans competing for claims to the greatest average utility?

I agree that a lot of our identity is shaped by these other factors like age, race, etc, but these factors are morally irrelevant. You could make the same argument against morality as you're making against the veil. You could argue that morality can't be universal and categorical because each person is unique. We have to abstract from those unique features to features we all share in order to be moral agents, just like we do ( maybe to a greater extent) when we do physics or math.

I'm going to go ahead and play devil's advocate because it is more fun that way. So..here it goes. You say that it screens out morally arbitrary factors, but doesn't our context define most of our oughts. To take a more communitarian view, aren't a number of my roles and "oughts" due to the role I have in a relationship such as a parent, teacher, child etc. Those things cannot be erased as morally arbitrary. That was one of the criticisms MacIntyre had. The individual becomes too atomised.

Granted that takes a more virtue ethics interpretation (which isn't necessarily exclusive) approach to it. There is also the issue of children, who may be equal but are generally not free as they are under the care of their parents. That context is important.

[KR Wordgazer]

Question: Given what you've been discussing, how does Rawls address the issue of systemic inequities and oppression? If you simply present each person as a free and equal citizen, ignoring things like race and sex, then don't you sort of lose track of the fact that the status quo by default favors one sex and one race? In other words, how does this avoid the problems of the failed concept of "color blindness"? Or is it really the same thing?

[Jim B.]

I'm going to go ahead and play devil's advocate because it is more fun that way. So..here it goes. You say that it screens out morally arbitrary factors, but doesn't our context define most of our oughts. To take a more communitarian view, aren't a number of my roles and "oughts" due to the role I have in a relationship such as a parent, teacher, child etc. Those things cannot be erased as morally arbitrary. That was one of the criticisms MacIntyre had. The individual becomes too atomised.

Granted that takes a more virtue ethics interpretation (which isn't necessarily exclusive) approach to it. There is also the issue of children, who may be equal but are generally not free as they are under the care of their parents. That context is important.

So I see your devil's advocate and raise you one No, I wouldn't say that our context defines most of our oughts/rights. Our oughts/rights don't have to be occurrent oughts/rights. That's way too positivistic imo to even begin to describe the normativity of morals. They are values and norms and can't be captured completely in talk about current facts. If I have kids, I ought to provide for them because one ought to provide minimal goods for those in one's care ( i.e. those I'm responsible for who aren't responsible for themselves), but just because I don't have kids doesn't mean that that obligation just goes away. Oughts and rights don't magically pop into and out of reality depending on whether they are currently being expressed or exercised. Otherwise, if I'm currently under anaesthesia, I would lose all of my rights and obligations. Or if I have no property that I wouldn't have a right to property, or if I'm stranded on a desert island, I lose all my rights and obligations simply because there's no one else around to currently activate them. There are conditionals implicit in these things. They are part of the structure of being a person, not a function of one's current context.

So I guess I'm not sure what you mean by "atomized." Just because there are things about us that are abstractable wouldn't mean that we're atomized. If you and I and every other moral actor ought not to steal (prima facie), how does that atomize us? Or if a classroom of students all work the same arithmetic problem, does that atomize them? We're all under the same moral code but only under a description involving what we ideally ought to do, not what we currently are, which are flawed, fully unique individuals.

[Jim B.]

Question: Given what you've been discussing, how does Rawls address the issue of systemic inequities and oppression? If you simply present each person as a free and equal citizen, ignoring things like race and sex, then don't you sort of lose track of the fact that the status quo by default favors one sex and one race? In other words, how does this avoid the problems of the failed concept of "color blindness"? Or is it really the same thing?

Good question, KRW. You know, I'm not a Rawls expert. Actually, I think Joe knows more about him than I do. But I would say that Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is designed specifically to address the problems you mention. Why are things like systemic oppression based on class, sex, ethnicity wrong? How do we justify remedying these injustices and how do we go about doing it? Favoring one group over another for morally arbitrary reasons is exactly what the veil is designed to prevent. If I'm a representative meeting with other representatives trying to get the "best deal" for my constituents, BUT I know nothing about my constituents, not race, religion, sex, or even the historical era that they live in, if I'm blinded to all that, and every other representative is also, we'll strike the fairest deal for everyone. A deal that all reasonable citizens would agree to. We'd come up with a deal in which every possible constituent would have as fair and equal an opportunity for a decent life as every other one. The fact that those in power favor white men is because they are NOT operating behind the veil but peeking under it to rig the distribution of opportunities in favor of white men.

[KR Wordgazer]

The fact that those in power favor white men is because they are NOT operating behind the veil but peeking under it to rig the distribution of opportunities in favor of white men.

Yes, in the beginning. But all that is necessary nowadays to keep the distribution of opportunities in favor of white men is to let the status quo remain. Rigging is not necessary; it's already in place and needs to be actively dismantled. In this state of affairs, it becomes necessary to peek under the veil to SEE that the system is rigged in favor of the white male.

In short, I don't think a "veil of ignorance" works unless we start from a foundation of equal justice that currently doesn't exist. But Rawls probably takes this into account. I'm just not that familiar with him.

[Jim B.]

The fact that those in power favor white men is because they are NOT operating behind the veil but peeking under it to rig the distribution of opportunities in favor of white men.

Yes, in the beginning. But all that is necessary nowadays to keep the distribution of opportunities in favor of white men is to let the status quo remain. Rigging is not necessary; it's already in place and needs to be actively dismantled. In this state of affairs, it becomes necessary to peek under the veil to SEE that the system is rigged in favor of the white male.

In short, I don't think a "veil of ignorance" works unless we start from a foundation of equal justice that currently doesn't exist. But Rawls probably takes this into account. I'm just not that familiar with him.

Maybe you're right -- if certain attitudes become entrenched enough, there'd have to be an active disruption and dismantling. I think in terms of justification, though, justice as fairness cuts to the quick. Why else has the right been apoplectic about destroying Rawls for the last 40 yrs? Maybe the veil has to do more with justification and strategy but tactics could be differnt. These inequities have to do with what people assume and how they act, it's an ongoing thing even if it;s become like second nature. If you can cut the justification out from under people with these assumptions, that's pretty disruptive. Anyone who can be appealed to in terms of justice as fairness KNOWS the game's rigged and those who don't know it can never be appealed to. All the progressive movements and legilsation in the past 50 yrs assumes all this and has been driven basically by Rawlsian principles.

[mdsimpson92]

So I guess I'm not sure what you mean by "atomized." Just because there are things about us that are abstractable wouldn't mean that we're atomized. If you and I and every other moral actor ought not to steal (prima facie), how does that atomize us? Or if a classroom of students all work the same arithmetic problem, does that atomize them? We're all under the same moral code but only under a description involving what we ideally ought to do, not what we currently are, which are flawed, fully unique individuals.

I was referencing MacIntyre when saying that. I'm a bit of a communitarian (a bit, not totally convinced). I not sure that the kind of "blank slate"/standard human being makes sense even in a theoretical perspective. I say this because I think that much of what makes a human rational/ethical/ and human is its attachment to other humans. We are, after all, social animals. You can even see it with those children who grew up outside of society (the wolf children).

[Jim B.]

So I guess I'm not sure what you mean by "atomized." Just because there are things about us that are abstractable wouldn't mean that we're atomized. If you and I and every other moral actor ought not to steal (prima facie), how does that atomize us? Or if a classroom of students all work the same arithmetic problem, does that atomize them? We're all under the same moral code but only under a description involving what we ideally ought to do, not what we currently are, which are flawed, fully unique individuals.

I was referencing MacIntyre when saying that. I'm a bit of a communitarian (a bit, not totally convinced). I not sure that the kind of "blank slate"/standard human being makes sense even in a theoretical perspective. I say this because I think that much of what makes a human rational/ethical/ and human is its attachment to other humans. We are, after all, social animals. You can even see it with those children who grew up outside of society (the wolf children).

I'm a communitarian too. And I agree with you that morality forms in attachments of people for one another. I'm not arguing for a "blank slate" approach. But morality can't be nothing over and above mutual interdependence, because then all sorts of species would be moral. I think rationality is also required, and you may be right in that rationality requires mutual attachments as a necessary, but not a sufficient condition. Once you have rationality in a social setting, then you have objective principles kick in, imo. Morality seems to be objective in some sense, although probably not absolute. Once we are 'persons' (rational beings in a social setting), then I think we're acting under some set of objective principles, although I admit that these claims are hard to completely justify.