Best Reason

Discuss arguments for existence of God and faith in general. Any aspect of any orientation toward religion/spirituality, as long as it is based upon a positive open to other people attitude.

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marxiavelli
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Re: Best Reason

Post by marxiavelli » Wed Dec 10, 2008 1:57 am

This is somewhat of a tangent, but I thought I'd respond...
The idea hat it died out in formal philosophy has nothing to do with how we actually look at the world. philosophers understand the world in different terms. Reid was taken to have lost to Hume and we move on from Hume to Kant and then other post Kantians. But in fact Reid did not lose. Hume got more press, Reid actually was right and Hume was wrong. Moreover importantly Reid was concerned with the way people really see things not with formal philosophy.
The motivation of philosophy since Socrates has been to specifically not simply be content with how we "actually" see the world but to try to see it for what it really is. If Reid wanted to articulate the various beliefs mechanisms by which these "ordinary perceptions" took place, then I would call him a good proto-psychologist. But whether a good psychologist is the same thing as a good philosopher is another matter. I am aware that there are some schools of philosophy that regard the two as basically the same thing; certainly the early natural language analysts did, and I'm told that there is a great revival of Reid's philosophy at Brown's department for perhaps that very reason.
If you think about it you will see what I mean, "do you feel hot or is it only me?" "did you see that?" we are still taken roll of others to determine if our perceptions are regular, consistent, and shared. The shared part is "inter-subjective" which is a phenomenological category.
Sure. And there has been plenty written in the philosophy of phenomenology about using phenomenology to ground instrumental reason and reconizing the perils of the latter when it attains power that no longer makes reference to the "subjective". A good essay on this is Adorno's recognition of the inversion of subjective and objective in Minima Moralia. But anyway, that is quite a different claim then saying that the category of the phenomenon can simply replace the ontic simpliciter. I'm not accusing you of saying that, mind you, but it's a risk I'd rather us both be aware of than not.

- "marxiavelli"

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Re: Best Reason

Post by Metacrock » Wed Dec 10, 2008 3:11 pm

I all get back and answer your posts in a bit. just quick comment. your screen name is interesting. Are you a Marxist?

aren't' many of us left now days. I was a Trot.
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Re: Best Reason

Post by Metacrock » Wed Dec 10, 2008 3:20 pm

marxiavelli wrote:
who are you quoting?
I was quoting "sgttomas".
I see
God cannot be studies scientifically in a direct sense. Because God is not given in sense data. But what can be studies the "trace" of god, the co-determinate. that is the concept of the signature. the footprint. The effect of having encountered the divine, which is mystical experince.
I understand that basic premise of your argument. What I don't understand is whether or not you are saying that the "trace" of God is subject to the same rules of inference and warranted belief that other forms of empirical information are.
yes, although that is the trace of God is a bit difficult because unless you already know God exists then it's circular reasoning. To get around that you have to just construe that it's God based upon the nature of the experince, the ancient association, and the nature of religion as the upshot of these experinces.

the long term effect of having had the experince is the issue not the sensation in the experince itself. although the commonalities that emerge from the sensation are interesting because they imply that it might be something universal that is being experienced, the effects of having had the experince, the life transformation is also a commonality that emerges. That cannot be accounted for by naturalistic counter causality.
Okay. First of all, since when does "life transformation" has any inherent relationship to the veracity of the percieved agent of change? Think about how many people's lives have been positively changed by Scientology, for example. As it happens, the Church of Scientology is heavily invested in various drug rehabilitation drug programs.
the term "transformation" means for the better. It's not just saying it changes it, like a car wreck changes it, but that's it's changed in a way that enable one to become a more healthy and whole person. Very things do that. I don't think you have can find any data to suggest that Scientology does that.

But in any case, let's say that Scientologists start pointing to their reformed addicts as evidence that the Xenu the Galactic Overlord is real. After all, they've had experiences of being occupied by body thetans (or whatever they believe in), etc, and they've had a positive long-lasting life transformation. Does that mean it's all true? Is that all it takes? What I'm trying to do here is take your specific claims and try to figure out what kind of epistemic committments you're working with here.
we know that's true of people who have had mystical experinces, show me data on Scientology. have they been measured by the M scale?

there's also the possibility that they have been transformed and they do have mystical experiences. These experinces are not limited to any particular group or religion. God is a reality behind all religions.You have to figure even cults and fronts for scams could be vehicle through which God will reach people. The Christian churches aren't perfect either.

Second of all, why can't "life transformation" be accounted for by "naturalistic counter causality"? I mean, there are basically three broad categories under which someone in your position would know this. (a) Enough research has been done to show that there is no naturalistic cause for "life transformation" as a result of having had a mystical experience. (b) No naturalistic cause is possible in principle. (c) You're just speculating.
It's your burden to show me that. I haven't been able to find any. Now I"m open to the possibility, but it's your burden to prove it.


Are you claiming (a)? I assume you are not since ruling out naturalistic causality for the phenomena you're referring to would require an enormous amount of research. For the sake of charity, I will assume you are not simply (c) speculating. Is there (b) a reason in principle natural causes alone could not generate these experiences? If so, what would that reason be?

- "marxiavelli"
[/quote]

by process of elimination I've ruled out several categories such as mental illness, drugs, some of the "God part of the brain" answers that one finds being made by neurological types, and ergot poisoning, Proudfoot's labeling argument and several other possibilities. I've been arguing this with atheists for close to 10 years and I have yet to see an atheist bring up anything that flys.
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Re: Best Reason

Post by Metacrock » Wed Dec 10, 2008 3:24 pm

marxiavelli wrote:This is somewhat of a tangent, but I thought I'd respond...
The idea hat it died out in formal philosophy has nothing to do with how we actually look at the world. philosophers understand the world in different terms. Reid was taken to have lost to Hume and we move on from Hume to Kant and then other post Kantians. But in fact Reid did not lose. Hume got more press, Reid actually was right and Hume was wrong. Moreover importantly Reid was concerned with the way people really see things not with formal philosophy.
The motivation of philosophy since Socrates has been to specifically not simply be content with how we "actually" see the world but to try to see it for what it really is. If Reid wanted to articulate the various beliefs mechanisms by which these "ordinary perceptions" took place, then I would call him a good proto-psychologist. But whether a good psychologist is the same thing as a good philosopher is another matter. I am aware that there are some schools of philosophy that regard the two as basically the same thing; certainly the early natural language analysts did, and I'm told that there is a great revival of Reid's philosophy at Brown's department for perhaps that very reason.

Hume argued that we don't see causality we have to assume it and then embarked upon empiricism as a way to understand that. Reid argued that we don't need this bs about billiard balls becasue common sense tells us to go by the nature of our perceptions. That's probably one reason modern philosophers don't like him, they hate common sense.
If you think about it you will see what I mean, "do you feel hot or is it only me?" "did you see that?" we are still taken roll of others to determine if our perceptions are regular, consistent, and shared. The shared part is "inter-subjective" which is a phenomenological category.
Sure. And there has been plenty written in the philosophy of phenomenology about using phenomenology to ground instrumental reason and reconizing the perils of the latter when it attains power that no longer makes reference to the "subjective". A good essay on this is Adorno's recognition of the inversion of subjective and objective in Minima Moralia. But anyway, that is quite a different claim then saying that the category of the phenomenon can simply replace the ontic simpliciter. I'm not accusing you of saying that, mind you, but it's a risk I'd rather us both be aware of than not.

- "marxiavelli"
[/quote]


what I don't see in your argument is valid reason to question RE when it can be pinned down with the M scale but you don't question other things that equally unprovable in an absolute sense. Your not really being fair to the way we actually opporate epistemically.
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