how are scientific beliefs caused?

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Jim B.
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Re: how are scientific beliefs caused?

Post by Jim B. » Fri May 19, 2017 3:23 pm

The Pixie wrote: Your first comment (outside of quotes) on this thread was:

"For true justification, you need something beyond efficient causation, the purview of the natural sciences."

I took that to mean you were proposing something outside the natural world, i.e., the supernatural, and given the background here, a soul, a spirit or god seemed more than likely. Here we are on page five, and now it turns out I have no idea what you are claiming.
Just because something is not explainable by the natural sciences doesn't mean that thing would be 'supernatural.' There are good reasons to believe that the natural extends beyond what is physical to include things like consciousness, norms, values, meaning. Don't you remember all the times we've discussed this? Maybe I wasn't clear enough.
A combination of factors (prior causes) contributed to giving the dollar, one of which was your prior belief that "one should help the needy whenever possible". How you can claim that belief did not precede the decision I cannot imagine. Clearly you already held the belief when the action was initiated, and clearly if you did not hold that belief at that point you would not have handed over the dollar.

The prior belief was, in part, the cause of the action.
I form the belief because I already acknowledge the persuasiveness of the rule, not the other way. My beliefs and the rules I follow can be wrong, as far as accuracy, practicality or morality. Causes cannot be 'wrong'. They operate at a different level.

The normative force of the rule to help the needy doesn't begin to exist the moment I believe in it. It doesn't 'exist' in the same way as causes exist and so it doesn't exert causal power the same way either. If it's right to help the needy, that rightness is not datable. We can't say "It was right to do so beginning on this date and ending on that date," as we can with causes. Causes operate temporally. Reasons don't seem to.
Purposes are (or give) reasons and of course they do precede effects. If you did not have the purpose of getting to work, why did you get in your car? The purpose may be a goal to be achieved in the future, but the purpose has to come first so you can act on it towards achieving that goal.
Maybe. The reasonableness of the purpose, tied in with earning a living, supporting loved ones etc and reasons supporting those doesn't precede its effects in the same way as causes do. It's the persuasiveness of the reasons I act on that are why I act, not because of beliefs or events in my brain that are popping like combustions of air and gas that drive pistons.

No one is arguing that "reason" and "cause" are synonyms.
I thought you were arguing that reasons are causes or at least a kind of cause. If not, what are we arguing about?
Okay. So?
Reasons can be realized in multiple, and in many cases, an infinite variety of ways, unlike causes. One billiard ball cannot cause another one to move in precisely the same fashion in an infinite number of ways. If the reason for moving my body is to communicate that the captive dies, i could point my thumb downward, touch my nose, speak in code, smile, look at the sky, or do nothing at all etc. Conversely, touching my nose can mean an infinite number of things, ie it can be any number of different actions. In the first case, one action can be realized by an infinite number of bodily movements. In the second, one movement can be an infinite number of actions.

The question here is: Do you hold to final causation in the sense Aristotle does?

If not, there is no point discussing what Aristotle said.
Yes, I do. But I think that conscious final causation can only occur in some conscious beings, humans and a few other species.

Why? We just agreed it was you doing the weighting and valuation. Does that weighting and valuation suddenly become meaningless if it is based on your prior state; your memories to that point, your genetic make up, your circumstances?
Yes, as I see it. I'm no differnt from a complex machine in that case. "I" am merely the locus in which causes discharge themselves.
I think, on the contrary, that weighting and valuation would be meaningless if it was not based on those things, but was arbitrary or random.
That's a very good point. I'm not saying it happens randomly. i'm saying it happens due to reasons,but that the reasons don't compel my decision. If i try to persuade you to go to law school rather than med school, the reasons i give you don't necessarily cause your decision even if they influence it. Otherwise there'd be no difference in kind between my placing a chip in your brain that would compel you to go to law school and my trying to persuade you.

The Pixie
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Re: how are scientific beliefs caused?

Post by The Pixie » Sat May 20, 2017 2:27 am

Jim B. wrote:Just because something is not explainable by the natural sciences doesn't mean that thing would be 'supernatural.' There are good reasons to believe that the natural extends beyond what is physical to include things like consciousness, norms, values, meaning. Don't you remember all the times we've discussed this? Maybe I wasn't clear enough.
These are all things that supervene on the physical world. They all require human beings to allow them to exist. Just like compter software requires hardware to exist, despite just being information. I do not think science can tell us what is right or wrong, but it can potentially tell us how we think it (just as looking at the hardware of a computer can tell you how a program would run, but nothing about what it actually does).

At least, that is the naturalistic view. Theology generally posits a soul or spirit where this is done, and that would be beyond science.

However, your position seems tobe neither one nor the other. Are you saying that consciousness has no supernatural element, that it does not involve (or perhaps require) a spirit/soul, and yet could never be explained by science?
I form the belief because I already acknowledge the persuasiveness of the rule, not the other way.
So the cause was the persuasiveness of the rule, and the effect was the belief.
My beliefs and the rules I follow can be wrong, as far as accuracy, practicality or morality. Causes cannot be 'wrong'. They operate at a different level.
Because when we discuss them, we discuss them at different levels.
The normative force of the rule to help the needy doesn't begin to exist the moment I believe in it. It doesn't 'exist' in the same way as causes exist and so it doesn't exert causal power the same way either. If it's right to help the needy, that rightness is not datable. We can't say "It was right to do so beginning on this date and ending on that date," as we can with causes. Causes operate temporally. Reasons don't seem to.
Again, no one is arguing that "reason" and "cause" are synonyms.

Beliefs are datable. Presumably there was a time, say as a toddler, when you did not have this belief. Now you do. At some point in time your belief began. I appreciate there is some fuzziness, as it can be a gradual thing, but it would still be datable.

You say "If it's right to help the needy, that rightness is not datable." Fair enough. But what we are talking about is your belief that its right.

Maybe. The reasonableness of the purpose, tied in with earning a living, supporting loved ones etc and reasons supporting those doesn't precede its effects in the same way as causes do. It's the persuasiveness of the reasons I act on that are why I act, not because of beliefs or events in my brain that are popping like combustions of air and gas that drive pistons.
What is the different here between "persuasiveness of the reasons" and "beliefs or events in my brain that are popping like combustions of air and gas that drive pistons"? They seem to be the same thing to me.
I thought you were arguing that reasons are causes or at least a kind of cause. If not, what are we arguing about?
Reasons can be the cause of actions.
Reasons can be realized in multiple, and in many cases, an infinite variety of ways, unlike causes. One billiard ball cannot cause another one to move in precisely the same fashion in an infinite number of ways. If the reason for moving my body is to communicate that the captive dies, i could point my thumb downward, touch my nose, speak in code, smile, look at the sky, or do nothing at all etc. Conversely, touching my nose can mean an infinite number of things, ie it can be any number of different actions. In the first case, one action can be realized by an infinite number of bodily movements. In the second, one movement can be an infinite number of actions.
For the billiard balls analogy, you have to appreciate that there are several million players, all taking a shot at the same time. It is the combination of all those inputs into the system that causes the complexity.
The question here is: Do you hold to final causation in the sense Aristotle does?

If not, there is no point discussing what Aristotle said.
Yes, I do. But I think that conscious final causation can only occur in some conscious beings, humans and a few other species.
Yes you do, but actually no you do not.

For Aristotle the final causation is the purpose for which it exist or was done. The purpose of a ship is transportation, the purpose of exercise is to be healthy. You seem to be twisting that around to say that final causation is the purpose in an intelligent agent (i.e., in the ship builder or the person doing exercise).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/
Yes, as I see it. I'm no differnt from a complex machine in that case. "I" am merely the locus in which causes discharge themselves.
...
That's a very good point. I'm not saying it happens randomly. i'm saying it happens due to reasons,but that the reasons don't compel my decision. If i try to persuade you to go to law school rather than med school, the reasons i give you don't necessarily cause your decision even if they influence it. Otherwise there'd be no difference in kind between my placing a chip in your brain that would compel you to go to law school and my trying to persuade you.
Sure, because you are just one of the million billiard players, and there are 999 999 others taking shots.

Jim B.
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Re: how are scientific beliefs caused?

Post by Jim B. » Sat May 20, 2017 6:43 pm

The Pixie wrote: These are all things that supervene on the physical world. They all require human beings to allow them to exist. Just like compter software requires hardware to exist, despite just being information. I do not think science can tell us what is right or wrong, but it can potentially tell us how we think it (just as looking at the hardware of a computer can tell you how a program would run, but nothing about what it actually does).
There are good arguments against the supervenience of consciousness, and if the other things I listed require consciousness, to that extent they may be non-supervenient as well.

However, your position seems tobe neither one nor the other. Are you saying that consciousness has no supernatural element, that it does not involve (or perhaps require) a spirit/soul, and yet could never be explained by science?
Yes, that would be my position. There seems to be an irreducibly intrinsic aspect to reality and though something like God or mind 'behind' reality might be the most parsimonious explanation, I don't think it's required.
So the cause was the persuasiveness of the rule, and the effect was the belief.
If you define 'cause' in the broad Aristotelean sense of "reason why," it might be the cause to some extent but never a complete "reason why." If you define 'cause' in the modern scientific sense of compelling prior necessary and sufficient condition for an event, then it would not be.
Again, no one is arguing that "reason" and "cause" are synonyms.
So you're not saying that reasons are causes? And lots of people argue that they're synonymous or at least that reasons are a kind of cause.
Beliefs are datable. Presumably there was a time, say as a toddler, when you did not have this belief. Now you do. At some point in time your belief began. I appreciate there is some fuzziness, as it can be a gradual thing, but it would still be datable.

You say "If it's right to help the needy, that rightness is not datable." Fair enough. But what we are talking about is your belief that its right.
But my belief is not the reason for my acting. It's the motivating force but not the justifying force. (I'm using 'force' metaphorically here.) It's like the difference between my saying "I first had a desire to believe that lying was wrong on Aug 27, 1970" and "Lying was first wrong on Aug 27, 1970."
What is the different here between "persuasiveness of the reasons" and "beliefs or events in my brain that are popping like combustions of air and gas that drive pistons"? They seem to be the same thing to me.
The first is what the second are about. If I experience red, that experience correlates with things happening in my brain, but those things in my brain are not red.
For the billiard balls analogy, you have to appreciate that there are several million players, all taking a shot at the same time. It is the combination of all those inputs into the system that causes the complexity.
But if it's a conceptual difference, that wouldn't depend on scale
Yes you do, but actually no you do not.

For Aristotle the final causation is the purpose for which it exist or was done. The purpose of a ship is transportation, the purpose of exercise is to be healthy. You seem to be twisting that around to say that final causation is the purpose in an intelligent agent (i.e., in the ship builder or the person doing exercise).
Yes, I believe in that. But the ship's purpose isn't intrinsic to it. it's observer-dependent. It was put there by the builder of the ship and by others who acknowledge that purpose. It's not like saying the 'purpose' of an acorn is a mature oak tree or the 'purpose' of a hen's egg is a mature chicken. Nothing about this issue depends on those ideas.
Sure, because you are just one of the million billiard players, and there are 999 999 others taking shots.
Wouldn;t it make more sense to say that "I" AM the billion billiard players?That doesn't afect what I a;ready wrote. It's a complex machine. Unless something else is there, maybe a radically emergent property, the level of complexity is irrelevant to what we're discussing.

The Pixie
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Re: how are scientific beliefs caused?

Post by The Pixie » Sun May 21, 2017 9:23 am

Jim B. wrote:There are good arguments against the supervenience of consciousness, and if the other things I listed require consciousness, to that extent they may be non-supervenient as well.
I have yet to find a convincing one.
Yes, that would be my position. There seems to be an irreducibly intrinsic aspect to reality and though something like God or mind 'behind' reality might be the most parsimonious explanation, I don't think it's required.
What does "irreducibly intrinsic aspect to reality" mean? If you are saying there is an aspect of reality that is both intrinsic too it and that cannot be reduced, then that would certainly seem likely. I suspect you mean more than that.
If you define 'cause' in the broad Aristotelean sense of "reason why," it might be the cause to some extent but never a complete "reason why." If you define 'cause' in the modern scientific sense of compelling prior necessary and sufficient condition for an event, then it would not be.
But the belief was the cause "to some extent"! The immediate cause was seeing a homeless man.
So you're not saying that reasons are causes? And lots of people argue that they're synonymous or at least that reasons are a kind of cause.
"are a kind of" is different to synonymous. And part of the problem is that "reason" has a number of related meanings.

If you say the reason you gave money to the homeless guy was because of your belief, then in that sense the belief was a type of cause (a contributary cause anyway).
But my belief is not the reason for my acting. It's the motivating force but not the justifying force. (I'm using 'force' metaphorically here.) It's like the difference between my saying "I first had a desire to believe that lying was wrong on Aug 27, 1970" and "Lying was first wrong on Aug 27, 1970."
I do not understand how "It's like" relates the first part to the second part here. They seem entirely separate.

Your belief contributed to causing the action. It was a contributary cause. If you did not have the belief, it would not have happened.

With regards to dating a belief, that would be the difference between "I first believed that lying was wrong on Aug 27, 1970" and "Lying was first wrong on Aug 27, 1970." What does it mean to have a desire to believe? Can you choose to believe in unicorns? I would have thought not.
The first is what the second are about. If I experience red, that experience correlates with things happening in my brain, but those things in my brain are not red.
Okay.
But if it's a conceptual difference, that wouldn't depend on scale
Why does it not depend on scale? Scale can have a huge impact. What is the difference between a light switch and a computer? What is the difference between the quantum world and the macroscopic? Scale!
Yes, I believe in that. But the ship's purpose isn't intrinsic to it. it's observer-dependent. It was put there by the builder of the ship and by others who acknowledge that purpose. It's not like saying the 'purpose' of an acorn is a mature oak tree or the 'purpose' of a hen's egg is a mature chicken. Nothing about this issue depends on those ideas.
So now we have agreed that final causation is the function for which the thing was made, how does that relate to our discussion?
Wouldn;t it make more sense to say that "I" AM the billion billiard players?
The players are the causes, so are mostly your prior mental states (your belief you should help homeless people) and partly things happening to you (seeing the homeless guy). The billiard balls are your thought processess.
That doesn't afect what I a;ready wrote. It's a complex machine. Unless something else is there, maybe a radically emergent property, the level of complexity is irrelevant to what we're discussing.
Exactly. A radical emergent property called consciousness.

Jim B.
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Re: how are scientific beliefs caused?

Post by Jim B. » Sun May 21, 2017 2:32 pm

The Pixie wrote: I have yet to find a convincing one.
What do you find unconvincing about them? Is it at least possible that Mary learns something new?
What does "irreducibly intrinsic aspect to reality" mean? If you are saying there is an aspect of reality that is both intrinsic too it and that cannot be reduced, then that would certainly seem likely. I suspect you mean more than that.
Yes. My position is that there's probably an irreducible aspect to reality that experiences are about, what they're composed of. There's only one reality but it seems to have two aspects or modes of presentation. I'm not arguing that there's some spooky 'other' realm that consciousness comes from.
But the belief was the cause "to some extent"! The immediate cause was seeing a homeless man.
But a cause necessitates its effect. To the extent that causes necessitate effects in my body, then they override me, my conscious volitional self. If my 'self' is the cause of effects in my body, then my mental states and other factors are contributing influences on me. So my seeing the homeless guy and my beliefs and desires regarding him all contribute to my decision but they don't necessitate it.

Imagine that you're standing on a bridge that's about 10 feet off the ground. In one case, you see someone you don't like directly below you. You decide to jump off hte bridge so as to land on him and injure him. In the second case, the bridge collapses causing you to fall on top of that same person. In the first case, you jumped so that your body becomes an instrument of you and your decision. In the second, your body is not an instrument of you or your conscious will and intent. It's just a falling object. In this case, your body was caused by factors that overrode you. In the first, you were not overridden. Moral responsibilty tracks this distinction between being 'caused' ie necessitated and not being necessitated. If you had as little control over your prior mental and psychological sttates in the first case as you had over the integrity of the bridge in the second, why would you be held responsible in the one case and not in the other?
So you're not saying that reasons are causes? And lots of people argue that they're synonymous or at least that reasons are a kind of cause.
"are a kind of" is different to synonymous. And part of the problem is that "reason" has a number of related meanings.
But my belief is not the reason for my acting. It's the motivating force but not the justifying force. (I'm using 'force' metaphorically here.) It's like the difference between my saying "I first had a desire to believe that lying was wrong on Aug 27, 1970" and "Lying was first wrong on Aug 27, 1970."
I do not understand how "It's like" relates the first part to the second part here. They seem entirely separate.
I was trying to distinguish between psychological history and justification. There was a time when I first learned that 2+2=4 but I justified it not because I learned it at that time. The two are different. My justification is about somethimg that's not historical. Causes, as in efficient causes, are historical.
Your belief contributed to causing the action. It was a contributary cause. If you did not have the belief, it would not have happened.
That's a counterfactual, a list of which is infinitely long. If my parents hadn't met, if the singularity hadn't happened...etc. What we're talking about includes sufficient conditions.
With regards to dating a belief, that would be the difference between "I first believed that lying was wrong on Aug 27, 1970" and "Lying was first wrong on Aug 27, 1970." What does it mean to have a desire to believe? Can you choose to believe in unicorns? I would have thought not.
That was awkwardly worded. But as an aside, I do think that desires and beliefs do inform each other all the time. Ever try to convince someone of something they're deeply invested in not believing? ;)
Why does it not depend on scale? Scale can have a huge impact. What is the difference between a light switch and a computer? What is the difference between the quantum world and the macroscopic? Scale!
Right, but this conceptual differnce doesn't seem to depend upon scale. Scale and complexity may cause or contribute to the emergence of consciousness and agency but the latter two would not be explainable solely through complexity and scale. other explanatory prinsciples would have to be used.
So now we have agreed that final causation is the function for which the thing was made, how does that relate to our discussion?
My original point was that to explain human actions, that real final causation, the fact that "I" can be influenced by states that do not and may never actually exist and by non-physical, ideal entities, must be invoked. Physical, efficient, biliard ball-type causation has trouble accounting for this.
The players are the causes, so are mostly your prior mental states (your belief you should help homeless people) and partly things happening to you (seeing the homeless guy). The billiard balls are your thought processess.
And where do "I" come in? Am I just a 'user illusion' that the system self-generates? Somehow all of these players and balls and events of balls hitting other balls results in some averaging or tallying up efect that is my decision?
Exactly. A radical emergent property called consciousness.
Radical as in having its own or capable of having its own causal powers? Consciousness may not emerge radically but already be part of the fabric of reality, as I alluded to above.

The Pixie
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Re: how are scientific beliefs caused?

Post by The Pixie » Sun May 21, 2017 4:10 pm

Jim B. wrote:What do you find unconvincing about them?
Pick one.
Is it at least possible that Mary learns something new?
I have no idea what this is about.
Yes. My position is that there's probably an irreducible aspect to reality that experiences are about, what they're composed of. There's only one reality but it seems to have two aspects or modes of presentation. I'm not arguing that there's some spooky 'other' realm that consciousness comes from.
When I read this I had no idea what you were talking about, however, your last paragraph sheds some light.
But a cause necessitates its effect.
Okay, that was not how I was using the word (I was thinking that several causes could combine to have an effect), but let us go with that.

You decision to give money had a single cause, and that necessitated that particular effect, but that single cause was the "sum" of numerous contributions, including your belief and the observation that the man was there.
To the extent that causes necessitate effects in my body, then they override me, my conscious volitional self. If my 'self' is the cause of effects in my body, then my mental states and other factors are contributing influences on me. So my seeing the homeless guy and my beliefs and desires regarding him all contribute to my decision but they don't necessitate it.
Your volitional self was the cause, or rather the exact state that your volitional self was in at that point. That state was due to any number of factors, such as the prior belief, and the man being there. The particular combination of seeing the homeless guy and your beliefs and desires regarding him all contribute to your decision that did indeed necessitate you giving the money. Hence, you gave the money!

You think you had a choice, and that therefore it was not certain that you would act that way. The reality is that you had a choice, and you made the decision you did because of your mental state at that point - there was a reason why you acted as you did - and so you were bound to act that way.
Imagine that you're standing on a bridge that's about 10 feet off the ground. In one case, you see someone you don't like directly below you. You decide to jump off hte bridge so as to land on him and injure him. In the second case, the bridge collapses causing you to fall on top of that same person. In the first case, you jumped so that your body becomes an instrument of you and your decision. In the second, your body is not an instrument of you or your conscious will and intent. It's just a falling object. In this case, your body was caused by factors that overrode you. In the first, you were not overridden. Moral responsibilty tracks this distinction between being 'caused' ie necessitated and not being necessitated. If you had as little control over your prior mental and psychological sttates in the first case as you had over the integrity of the bridge in the second, why would you be held responsible in the one case and not in the other?
So how does this moral responsibility play out? Does karma come and get you? As far as I can tell, moral responsibility is a social construct. That is, it is something that factors into your decision making, and it does so because society tells you to do, and society does that because mankind has found society works better that way.
I was trying to distinguish between psychological history and justification. There was a time when I first learned that 2+2=4 but I justified it not because I learned it at that time. The two are different. My justification is about somethimg that's not historical. Causes, as in efficient causes, are historical.
Okay.
That's a counterfactual, a list of which is infinitely long. If my parents hadn't met, if the singularity hadn't happened...etc. What we're talking about includes sufficient conditions.
I was using cause in a sense where something could have several cause, which you are not.

However, your belief is not like your parents meeting. The latter is a condition, as you say. However, your belief was also a part of the decision process; it contributed to the decision that was the cause.
That was awkwardly worded. But as an aside, I do think that desires and beliefs do inform each other all the time. Ever try to convince someone of something they're deeply invested in not believing? ;)
Tell me about it!
Right, but this conceptual differnce doesn't seem to depend upon scale. Scale and complexity may cause or contribute to the emergence of consciousness and agency but the latter two would not be explainable solely through complexity and scale. other explanatory prinsciples would have to be used.
Why?
My original point was that to explain human actions, that real final causation, the fact that "I" can be influenced by states that do not and may never actually exist and by non-physical, ideal entities, must be invoked. Physical, efficient, biliard ball-type causation has trouble accounting for this.
But that is not what Aristotle meant by final causation.
And where do "I" come in? Am I just a 'user illusion' that the system self-generates? Somehow all of these players and balls and events of balls hitting other balls results in some averaging or tallying up efect that is my decision?
You are the billard table. The table is not just a plain green surface, it is highly complex, and it changes in response to the action of the balls, whilst also modifying their motion. This is your mental state.

It is not a perfect analogy!
Radical as in having its own or capable of having its own causal powers? Consciousness may not emerge radically but already be part of the fabric of reality, as I alluded to above.
Do you think the brain of a spider has causal powers? I think so. I think a spider's brain can process events around it, and then cause the spider to act in an appropriate way. I do not see this as radical as you seem to.

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