how are scientific beliefs caused?

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The Pixie
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Re: how are scientific beliefs caused?

Post by The Pixie » Sun May 21, 2017 4:10 pm

Jim B. wrote:What do you find unconvincing about them?
Pick one.
Is it at least possible that Mary learns something new?
I have no idea what this is about.
Yes. My position is that there's probably an irreducible aspect to reality that experiences are about, what they're composed of. There's only one reality but it seems to have two aspects or modes of presentation. I'm not arguing that there's some spooky 'other' realm that consciousness comes from.
When I read this I had no idea what you were talking about, however, your last paragraph sheds some light.
But a cause necessitates its effect.
Okay, that was not how I was using the word (I was thinking that several causes could combine to have an effect), but let us go with that.

You decision to give money had a single cause, and that necessitated that particular effect, but that single cause was the "sum" of numerous contributions, including your belief and the observation that the man was there.
To the extent that causes necessitate effects in my body, then they override me, my conscious volitional self. If my 'self' is the cause of effects in my body, then my mental states and other factors are contributing influences on me. So my seeing the homeless guy and my beliefs and desires regarding him all contribute to my decision but they don't necessitate it.
Your volitional self was the cause, or rather the exact state that your volitional self was in at that point. That state was due to any number of factors, such as the prior belief, and the man being there. The particular combination of seeing the homeless guy and your beliefs and desires regarding him all contribute to your decision that did indeed necessitate you giving the money. Hence, you gave the money!

You think you had a choice, and that therefore it was not certain that you would act that way. The reality is that you had a choice, and you made the decision you did because of your mental state at that point - there was a reason why you acted as you did - and so you were bound to act that way.
Imagine that you're standing on a bridge that's about 10 feet off the ground. In one case, you see someone you don't like directly below you. You decide to jump off hte bridge so as to land on him and injure him. In the second case, the bridge collapses causing you to fall on top of that same person. In the first case, you jumped so that your body becomes an instrument of you and your decision. In the second, your body is not an instrument of you or your conscious will and intent. It's just a falling object. In this case, your body was caused by factors that overrode you. In the first, you were not overridden. Moral responsibilty tracks this distinction between being 'caused' ie necessitated and not being necessitated. If you had as little control over your prior mental and psychological sttates in the first case as you had over the integrity of the bridge in the second, why would you be held responsible in the one case and not in the other?
So how does this moral responsibility play out? Does karma come and get you? As far as I can tell, moral responsibility is a social construct. That is, it is something that factors into your decision making, and it does so because society tells you to do, and society does that because mankind has found society works better that way.
I was trying to distinguish between psychological history and justification. There was a time when I first learned that 2+2=4 but I justified it not because I learned it at that time. The two are different. My justification is about somethimg that's not historical. Causes, as in efficient causes, are historical.
Okay.
That's a counterfactual, a list of which is infinitely long. If my parents hadn't met, if the singularity hadn't happened...etc. What we're talking about includes sufficient conditions.
I was using cause in a sense where something could have several cause, which you are not.

However, your belief is not like your parents meeting. The latter is a condition, as you say. However, your belief was also a part of the decision process; it contributed to the decision that was the cause.
That was awkwardly worded. But as an aside, I do think that desires and beliefs do inform each other all the time. Ever try to convince someone of something they're deeply invested in not believing? ;)
Tell me about it!
Right, but this conceptual differnce doesn't seem to depend upon scale. Scale and complexity may cause or contribute to the emergence of consciousness and agency but the latter two would not be explainable solely through complexity and scale. other explanatory prinsciples would have to be used.
Why?
My original point was that to explain human actions, that real final causation, the fact that "I" can be influenced by states that do not and may never actually exist and by non-physical, ideal entities, must be invoked. Physical, efficient, biliard ball-type causation has trouble accounting for this.
But that is not what Aristotle meant by final causation.
And where do "I" come in? Am I just a 'user illusion' that the system self-generates? Somehow all of these players and balls and events of balls hitting other balls results in some averaging or tallying up efect that is my decision?
You are the billard table. The table is not just a plain green surface, it is highly complex, and it changes in response to the action of the balls, whilst also modifying their motion. This is your mental state.

It is not a perfect analogy!
Radical as in having its own or capable of having its own causal powers? Consciousness may not emerge radically but already be part of the fabric of reality, as I alluded to above.
Do you think the brain of a spider has causal powers? I think so. I think a spider's brain can process events around it, and then cause the spider to act in an appropriate way. I do not see this as radical as you seem to.

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Re: how are scientific beliefs caused?

Post by Jim B. » Mon May 22, 2017 2:06 pm

The Pixie wrote:
Is it at least possible that Mary learns something new?
I have no idea what this is about.
When you wrote that you have yet to see a convincing argument for the irreducibility of consciousness, I assumed that you'd have some familiarity with the arguments. Silly me.
Okay, that was not how I was using the word (I was thinking that several causes could combine to have an effect), but let us go with that.

You decision to give money had a single cause, and that necessitated that particular effect, but that single cause was the "sum" of numerous contributions, including your belief and the observation that the man was there.
How's that different from what I was saying? The "sum" of numerous contributions necessitates that the billiard ball moves in a certain way. My argument is that it's at least plausible that there's no "summing" up that bypasses my decision, my agency, at least in some decisions. I may act out of a compulsion, post-hypnotic suggestion or due to a brain chip -- for there to be a REAL difference between these 3 cases and my deciding due to reasons I've consciously and intentionally deliberated about, we need something more than a "summing" up of prior causes. It may be that something emerges, a conscious, intentional self, that can initiate causal chains and not just discharge already existing causal chains.
Your volitional self was the cause, or rather the exact state that your volitional self was in at that point. That state was due to any number of factors, such as the prior belief, and the man being there. The particular combination of seeing the homeless guy and your beliefs and desires regarding him all contribute to your decision that did indeed necessitate you giving the money. Hence, you gave the money!
But that's not the way deliberation happens. When I'm considering what to do, if I'm in a dilemma, I'm not passively waiting to see how my prior mental state "tallies up" into a decision. That would be the conception of the self as a very complex device. When I'm faced with a dilemma, it's often accompanied by anxiety before and regret or satisfaction after. The active, existential aspect of decisions is entirely missed in this mechanistic view.
You think you had a choice, and that therefore it was not certain that you would act that way. The reality is that you had a choice, and you made the decision you did because of your mental state at that point - there was a reason why you acted as you did - and so you were bound to act that way.
But if my mental state necessitated the outcome, then I didn't really have a choice after all, only the subjective sense that I did. What would be the adaptive advantage of this subjective sense? Or for consciousness itself, for that matter?
So how does this moral responsibility play out? Does karma come and get you? As far as I can tell, moral responsibility is a social construct. That is, it is something that factors into your decision making, and it does so because society tells you to do, and society does that because mankind has found society works better that way.
So you don't think there's any real differnce between me accidentally running someone over with my car through no fault of my own and my intentionally running someone down? You think that difference is just a social construct? Even social constructs track something real. In this case, I assume you think the 'something real' is better outcomes for society, ie prudentialism. But other cases of prudentialism we can 'step outside of' to temporarily suspend our engagement with it even when we're in the midst of it. Why is it so hard, I would say impossible, to truly 'step outside' of this attitude when we're in the midst of it?

I was using cause in a sense where something could have several cause, which you are not.
Sure I am. There are numerous causes acting on me all the time. The billiard ball's movement resulted from innumerable causes. What I'm saying is that in some cases, I am the cause of my actions.

Tell me about it!
That's teh way people with fundamenatl differences tend to see each other. That was my point. It's almost never a result of a completely dispassionate weighing of the evidence. Beliefs and desires are intertwined.
Why?
Consciousness is unique and doesn't seem reducible to physical facts alone. Same for the self.
But that is not what Aristotle meant by final causation.
He said that final causation is the purpose for which something is created or exists. I create my actions for certain purposes. I was distinguishing between intrinsic purpose, like my actions, and extrinsic purposes, like a hammer. I'm not sure if Aristotle went into this distinction. Why would it matter? Final cause itself is still an Aristotelean idea. Ideas can change somewhat over the millennia!
You are the billard table. The table is not just a plain green surface, it is highly complex, and it changes in response to the action of the balls, whilst also modifying their motion. This is your mental state.

It is not a perfect analogy!
I am the paart that decides which of the billions of possible outcomes I will execute, at least in some cases. Why is it so hard to entertain the possibility that something radically new can emerge within nature? The conscious emerging from the non-conscious wold already be a pretty radical emergence.
Do you think the brain of a spider has causal powers? I think so. I think a spider's brain can process events around it, and then cause the spider to act in an appropriate way. I do not see this as radical as you seem to.
No, I'm saying the self can initiate causal chains.

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Re: how are scientific beliefs caused?

Post by The Pixie » Tue May 23, 2017 2:44 am

Jim B. wrote:When you wrote that you have yet to see a convincing argument for the irreducibility of consciousness, I assumed that you'd have some familiarity with the arguments. Silly me.
Really?

When you said "There are good arguments against the supervenience of consciousness..." a few posts ago, but could not be bothered to actually cite one I assumed you did NOT have any familiarity with the arguments, and I was not about to research them for you.

So yes, silly you.
How's that different from what I was saying? The "sum" of numerous contributions necessitates that the billiard ball moves in a certain way. My argument is that it's at least plausible that there's no "summing" up that bypasses my decision, my agency, at least in some decisions. I may act out of a compulsion, post-hypnotic suggestion or due to a brain chip -- for there to be a REAL difference between these 3 cases and my deciding due to reasons I've consciously and intentionally deliberated about, we need something more than a "summing" up of prior causes. It may be that something emerges, a conscious, intentional self, that can initiate causal chains and not just discharge already existing causal chains.
So why do you make choices if not from the sum of prior causes? Can you give an example? Think back over the last day, and give an example of a decision, significant or trivial, that you made for no reason, and then tell us why you made it.

Please note, I am not saying you do not have intention; you clearly do. However, they are reasons for all your intentions. And of course you deliberate, that is the decision making process and is central to what I am saying.
But that's not the way deliberation happens. When I'm considering what to do, if I'm in a dilemma, I'm not passively waiting to see how my prior mental state "tallies up" into a decision. That would be the conception of the self as a very complex device. When I'm faced with a dilemma, it's often accompanied by anxiety before and regret or satisfaction after. The active, existential aspect of decisions is entirely missed in this mechanistic view.
When you take your time to make a decision, the decision making process becomes part of the prior states. If you were trying to decide yesterday, and are still undecided, then right now your prior state includes a full day of trying to decide, plus whatever extra influences you had over that time.

Your anxiety, regret and satisfaction are because you can envisage a future in which you made a certain decision and can project good and bad outcomes - and these projections will influence your decision too of course.
But if my mental state necessitated the outcome, then I didn't really have a choice after all, only the subjective sense that I did. What would be the adaptive advantage of this subjective sense? Or for consciousness itself, for that matter?
What does that even mean? If your mental state did NOT necessitate the outcome, then that would mean you had no choice.
So you don't think there's any real differnce between me accidentally running someone over with my car through no fault of my own and my intentionally running someone down? You think that difference is just a social construct? Even social constructs track something real. In this case, I assume you think the 'something real' is better outcomes for society, ie prudentialism. But other cases of prudentialism we can 'step outside of' to temporarily suspend our engagement with it even when we're in the midst of it. Why is it so hard, I would say impossible, to truly 'step outside' of this attitude when we're in the midst of it?
The difference is that running someone over with your car through no fault of your own was NOT necessitated by your mental state, whilst deliberately doing so was.
Sure I am. There are numerous causes acting on me all the time. The billiard ball's movement resulted from innumerable causes. What I'm saying is that in some cases, I am the cause of my actions.
Okay, my bad.
Consciousness is unique and doesn't seem reducible to physical facts alone. Same for the self.
And yet the only known instances of consciousness occur in very specific physical locations with just the right environment (i.e., the brain), and when the circumstances change, consciousness is obliged to change too. When the brain moves, the attached consciousness does too. When the brain is subjected to alcohol, consciousness is affected too. All the evidence points to consciousness supervening of the physical. Same for self.
He said that final causation is the purpose for which something is created or exists. I create my actions for certain purposes. I was distinguishing between intrinsic purpose, like my actions, and extrinsic purposes, like a hammer. I'm not sure if Aristotle went into this distinction. Why would it matter? Final cause itself is still an Aristotelean idea. Ideas can change somewhat over the millennia!
Why did you even mention Aristotle? I assumed it was because you believed he gave your argument authority. It only does that if you are using the same argument as him (and frankly, not much even then, in my opinion).
I am the paart that decides which of the billions of possible outcomes I will execute, at least in some cases. ...
I am arguing that the billiard balls and the table are the decision-making process (and medium). On one level, this is just billions of balls moving around a hyper-complex table, but on a higher level, this is a decision-making process.
... Why is it so hard to entertain the possibility that something radically new can emerge within nature? The conscious emerging from the non-conscious wold already be a pretty radical emergence.
Not sure what your point is here. It is me who is arguing for the possibility that something radical emerged.
Do you think the brain of a spider has causal powers? I think so. I think a spider's brain can process events around it, and then cause the spider to act in an appropriate way. I do not see this as radical as you seem to.
No, I'm saying the self can initiate causal chains.
So you do not think a spider's brain can process events around it, and then cause the spider to act in an appropriate way? How do you think spiders survive?

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Re: how are scientific beliefs caused?

Post by Jim B. » Tue May 23, 2017 4:18 pm

The Pixie wrote: Really?

When you said "There are good arguments against the supervenience of consciousness..." a few posts ago, but could not be bothered to actually cite one I assumed you did NOT have any familiarity with the arguments, and I was not about to research them for you.

So yes, silly you.
Here's what I wrote: "There are good arguments against the supervenience of consciousness..."

to which you wrote: "I have yet to find a convincing one..."

Your comment would suggest that you have actually found some arguments, that you might have the slightest familiarity with them. When i alluded to the most famous one, Frank Jackson's argument about Mary, the one that people with even the most superficial knowledge about the field would know about, you didn't have a clue, which is fine, but then be honest about it, mate. Why not say "I have a strong predisposition towards reductionism, including of consciousness, even though I don't know that much about it"? No one would think any less of you.

So why do you make choices if not from the sum of prior causes? Can you give an example? Think back over the last day, and give an example of a decision, significant or trivial, that you made for no reason, and then tell us why you made it.
I'm not saying it's for no reason. I'm saying that at least some decisions are not necessitated by prior conditions. "Happening for no reason" and "necessitated" don't necessarily exhaust the possibilities.
When you take your time to make a decision, the decision making process becomes part of the prior states. If you were trying to decide yesterday, and are still undecided, then right now your prior state includes a full day of trying to decide, plus whatever extra influences you had over that time.
But I am deciding which factors will have which and how much influence over me and so on ad infinitum. Of course, whatever thought I think will be realized by a set of occurent conditions, but that alone is no reason to think that those conditions are necessitating what I think and do. Common folk attitudes such as anxiety, regret and gratitude point us away from this mechanistic model and towards an emergent locus of cause action and responsibility. These attitudes alone are not determinative, but they give a strong prima facie case that there's something there that reductionism must account for and that it has so far been unable to account for. I'm not arguing for a soul or anything supernatural. A strong emergence would still be completely naturalistic. Could you at least entertain the possibility of such a thing?
Your anxiety, regret and satisfaction are because you can envisage a future in which you made a certain decision and can project good and bad outcomes - and these projections will influence your decision too of course.
But those outcomes would not be up to me but to a set of prior conditions that just happen to be associated with me. I don't have those attitudes about any other things associated with me for which i wouldn't normally feel responsibility. There are causal chains that pass through my mental states I do not have these attitudes about and other such chains that I DO have them about. What would distinguish between these two types of chains?
What does that even mean? If your mental state did NOT necessitate the outcome, then that would mean you had no choice.
That's ridiculous. If the outcome were for no reason at all then I would not have a choice. If I ask for peach pie over apple pie due to a quantum event in my brain, I had no choice. If I ask for it because of a chip in my brain, I had no choice. I have a choice only if I COULD HAVE CHOSEN DIFFERENTLY UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS. If I'm driving a tram, and the track curves left, i had no choice other than to go left ( other than stopping). You're saying that my prior conditions are tantamount to the "track" that's already been laid out for me and is being laid out for me as I decide. I have a choice only if there's a true 'branching' of the track, only if I cold have gone left or straight under the same tram conditions. Please note this is just an analogy, acrude one at that, and the tram and the track are meant to represent your decision and you, the conductor, as your conscious self.
The difference is that running someone over with your car through no fault of your own was NOT necessitated by your mental state, whilst deliberately doing so was.
But it could have been necesitated by my mental state, of course. Lots of things that are necessitated by my mental state, psychosis, trauma, PTSD, depression, obsessive compulsiveness, tourette's, etc etc, but these people are not held responsible normally. You have it turned around; if the running down was necessitated, by whatever factors either internal or external to the actor, he's not held responsible. If he had a choice, at least at some point, then he is.
And yet the only known instances of consciousness occur in very specific physical locations with just the right environment (i.e., the brain), and when the circumstances change, consciousness is obliged to change too. When the brain moves, the attached consciousness does too. When the brain is subjected to alcohol, consciousness is affected too. All the evidence points to consciousness supervening of the physical. Same for self.
That has nothing to do with what I've been saying. Correlations and counterfactuals don;t establish reduction. If my parents hadn't met, these characters wouldn't be appearing on this screen.
Why did you even mention Aristotle? I assumed it was because you believed he gave your argument authority. It only does that if you are using the same argument as him (and frankly, not much even then, in my opinion).
As a point of reference. If an idea is about eternal paradigms that condition particulars, then a point of reference would be to associate it with "Platonism"; associations are not identities. It is basically the same argument anyway, an argument for teleology, that the world is not explainable without seeing teleology as real. The point of the argument was to apply teleology and final causes to human actions. Human actions are what we're talking about, not oak trees and tigers. The part that differs with Aristotle is irrelevant to the argument. Please try to follow what's going. A big part of why Joe doesn't post on here anymore for this very reason; you get fixated on some irrelevant bit of minutiae and refuse to see the larger point and then legalistically litigate that irrelevant bit just to try to score a point.
I am arguing that the billiard balls and the table are the decision-making process (and medium). On one level, this is just billions of balls moving around a hyper-complex table, but on a higher level, this is a decision-making process.
Not sure what your point is here. It is me who is arguing for the possibility that something radical emerged.
What I'm suggesting is that this "higher level" is a conscious agent that can, at times, initiate chains of causes. Complexity can be capable of TRUE novelty on the order of consciousness emerging from non-consciousness. Your emergence is linear; but nature seems capable of non-linear radical emergence.
So you do not think a spider's brain can process events around it, and then cause the spider to act in an appropriate way? How do you think spiders survive?
Yes, I do think that. I doubt that spiders can initiate causal chains, as i think human agents can. Perhaps they can.

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Re: how are scientific beliefs caused?

Post by The Pixie » Wed May 24, 2017 3:14 am

Jim B. wrote:Here's what I wrote: "There are good arguments against the supervenience of consciousness..."

to which you wrote: "I have yet to find a convincing one..."

Your comment would suggest that you have actually found some arguments, that you might have the slightest familiarity with them.
It is a topic that comes up occasionally in discussions like this, and I have seen arguments against the supervenience of consciousness, and none have been convinicing. I cannot remember any of them, and if you could be bothered to present one, I surely was not going to be bothered to look one up.
When i alluded to the most famous one, Frank Jackson's argument about Mary, the one that people with even the most superficial knowledge about the field would know about, you didn't have a clue, which is fine, but then be honest about it, mate.
Ultimately I was matching your vague claims of "good arguments against the supervenience of consciousness". Anyone can claim there are good arguments for their position, but at the end of the day, it counts for zero until you present them. What you said was entirely vacuous. I matched that with an equally vacuous response.

If you want to proceed, perhaps you could say why you think Frank Jackson's argument is a good arguments against the supervenience of consciousness, because even after reviewing it, I still do not see it.
I'm not saying it's for no reason. I'm saying that at least some decisions are not necessitated by prior conditions. "Happening for no reason" and "necessitated" don't necessarily exhaust the possibilities.
So why do you make these decision if not because of the prior conditions?

Again I will ask, can you give a real-life example?
But I am deciding which factors will have which and how much influence over me and so on ad infinitum. Of course, whatever thought I think will be realized by a set of occurent conditions, but that alone is no reason to think that those conditions are necessitating what I think and do. Common folk attitudes such as anxiety, regret and gratitude point us away from this mechanistic model and towards an emergent locus of cause action and responsibility. These attitudes alone are not determinative, but they give a strong prima facie case that there's something there that reductionism must account for and that it has so far been unable to account for. I'm not arguing for a soul or anything supernatural. A strong emergence would still be completely naturalistic. Could you at least entertain the possibility of such a thing?
In the second post of this thread I said:

"Purpose emerged from the minds that were a product of evolution. If you want to call that a new mode of causation (as seems reasonable), then I disagree with these purported naturalists.

I became an atheist because the arrangement of atoms in my brain allowed consciousness to emerge, and that allowed me to evaluate the evidence.
"

Does it now transpire that actually you agree with me?
But those outcomes would not be up to me but to a set of prior conditions that just happen to be associated with me.
But that is you!
I don't have those attitudes about any other things associated with me for which i wouldn't normally feel responsibility. There are causal chains that pass through my mental states I do not have these attitudes about and other such chains that I DO have them about. What would distinguish between these two types of chains?
Now sure I understand. Could you give a hypothetical maybe?
That's ridiculous. If the outcome were for no reason at all then I would not have a choice. If I ask for peach pie over apple pie due to a quantum event in my brain, I had no choice. If I ask for it because of a chip in my brain, I had no choice. I have a choice only if I COULD HAVE CHOSEN DIFFERENTLY UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS.
But why would you? Are your choices just arbitrary? If not, then will make the same choice every time, if the conditions are perfectly identical.
If I'm driving a tram, and the track curves left, i had no choice other than to go left ( other than stopping). You're saying that my prior conditions are tantamount to the "track" that's already been laid out for me and is being laid out for me as I decide. I have a choice only if there's a true 'branching' of the track, only if I cold have gone left or straight under the same tram conditions. Please note this is just an analogy, acrude one at that, and the tram and the track are meant to represent your decision and you, the conductor, as your conscious self.
So what is the alternative? Do you think you have a choice if the tram goes randomly left or right? Or say you can go left, into a dark tunnel, or right into a dark tunnel, and both outcomes are, as far as you know, identical. You choice, then, is entirely arbitrary. Does that make it meaningful?
But it could have been necesitated by my mental state, of course. Lots of things that are necessitated by my mental state, psychosis, trauma, PTSD, depression, obsessive compulsiveness, tourette's, etc etc, but these people are not held responsible normally. You have it turned around; if the running down was necessitated, by whatever factors either internal or external to the actor, he's not held responsible. If he had a choice, at least at some point, then he is.
So we both agreed your mental state could necessitate it in some cases at least.

Do you think the legal system is generally a good guide to the nature of consciousness?
That has nothing to do with what I've been saying.
Fir point. I had not realised you were arguing for consciousness as an emergent property.
As a point of reference. If an idea is about eternal paradigms that condition particulars, then a point of reference would be to associate it with "Platonism"; associations are not identities. It is basically the same argument anyway, an argument for teleology, that the world is not explainable without seeing teleology as real. The point of the argument was to apply teleology and final causes to human actions. Human actions are what we're talking about, not oak trees and tigers. The part that differs with Aristotle is irrelevant to the argument. Please try to follow what's going. A big part of why Joe doesn't post on here anymore for this very reason; you get fixated on some irrelevant bit of minutiae and refuse to see the larger point and then legalistically litigate that irrelevant bit just to try to score a point.
It takes two to tango, Jim. If it is trivial, why are you still arguing it?
What I'm suggesting is that this "higher level" is a conscious agent that can, at times, initiate chains of causes. Complexity can be capable of TRUE novelty on the order of consciousness emerging from non-consciousness. Your emergence is linear; but nature seems capable of non-linear radical emergence.
Read what I typed in my first post on this thread.

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Re: how are scientific beliefs caused?

Post by Metacrock » Wed May 24, 2017 6:13 am

I've sort of last track of the original issue
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