we gotta get this thing kick started again.
Moderator:Metacrock
- fleetmouse
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This is turning into a good thread gents, no time for a substantial response today, will be back in here soon..
Re: we gotta get this thing kick started again.
I agree that it is. I might change the title. "let's get it kick started" doesn't say it.fleetmouse wrote:This is turning into a good thread gents, no time for a substantial response today, will be back in here soon..
Have Theology, Will argue: wire Metacrock
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Re: we gotta get this thing kick started again.
Just to hold down the fort until return of Fleetmouse I'm going to answer some of the stuff I didn't get to before:
That's really looking at it backwards. The point of the hard problem is to give the reductionists a problem they have to answer, not to make positive argument about the nature of consciousness. The hard problem is there. It has to be answered, it is a problem, it's not an assertion.fleetmouse wrote:This still leaves us with the problem of qualia - the hard problem of consciousness - but I don't see that positing mental substance or neutral substance with mental properties does anything more than kick the problem down the road. You're saying, this "stuff" has innate mental properties and we're not sure how. You're treating it as a black box, still not actually explaining it. And you're not just admitting but insisting that it's inexplicable in principle.
Have Theology, Will argue: wire Metacrock
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- mdsimpson92
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Re: we gotta get this thing kick started again.
Isn't that why Chalmers recommends property dualism, dual aspect theory, or neutral monism?Metacrock wrote:Just to hold down the fort until return of Fleetmouse I'm going to answer some of the stuff I didn't get to before:
That's really looking at it backwards. The point of the hard problem is to give the reductionists a problem they have to answer, not to make positive argument about the nature of consciousness. The hard problem is there. It has to be answered, it is a problem, it's not an assertion.fleetmouse wrote:This still leaves us with the problem of qualia - the hard problem of consciousness - but I don't see that positing mental substance or neutral substance with mental properties does anything more than kick the problem down the road. You're saying, this "stuff" has innate mental properties and we're not sure how. You're treating it as a black box, still not actually explaining it. And you're not just admitting but insisting that it's inexplicable in principle.
Julia: It's all... a dream...
Spike Spiegel: Yeah... just a dream...
Spike Spiegel: Yeah... just a dream...
Re: we gotta get this thing kick started again.
mdsimpson92 wrote:Isn't that why Chalmers recommends property dualism, dual aspect theory, or neutral monism?Metacrock wrote:Just to hold down the fort until return of Fleetmouse I'm going to answer some of the stuff I didn't get to before:
That's really looking at it backwards. The point of the hard problem is to give the reductionists a problem they have to answer, not to make positive argument about the nature of consciousness. The hard problem is there. It has to be answered, it is a problem, it's not an assertion.fleetmouse wrote:This still leaves us with the problem of qualia - the hard problem of consciousness - but I don't see that positing mental substance or neutral substance with mental properties does anything more than kick the problem down the road. You're saying, this "stuff" has innate mental properties and we're not sure how. You're treating it as a black box, still not actually explaining it. And you're not just admitting but insisting that it's inexplicable in principle.
well the why of that has to do with his over all world view. Though I agree with Chalmers o many things about consciousness ultimately I don't like his overall view. He's of these anti-human guys who wants to think we can b like the borg and be augmented with technology and move beyond humanity. I think that's a recipe for all kinds of disasters. I'm not necessary a property dualist. Although that really depends upon the week.
Have Theology, Will argue: wire Metacrock
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- mdsimpson92
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Re: we gotta get this thing kick started again.
Ah, a transhumanist, yeah, I'm not completely against using it that way, but there are a LOT of serious potential social problems coming from it....
Julia: It's all... a dream...
Spike Spiegel: Yeah... just a dream...
Spike Spiegel: Yeah... just a dream...
Re: we gotta get this thing kick started again.
i like humanity. I'm a humanist (Christian) I think those guys are nuts.mdsimpson92 wrote:Ah, a transhumanist, yeah, I'm not completely against using it that way, but there are a LOT of serious potential social problems coming from it....
Have Theology, Will argue: wire Metacrock
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- fleetmouse
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Re: we gotta get this thing kick started again.
Metacrock, let's try a thought experiment.
Let's say a mad scientist kidnaps you and runs you through a duplication machine. Now there are two of you. The subjective experience of the duplicate is identical to the first - the same memories, emotions, reactions - you find yourselves uttering the same words and phrases of shock and dismay as you look at each other.
The odd thing is, because you had to be unconscious during the duplication process, you and your duplicate are not sure which is the "original". And if it's an exact duplicate, does it even matter?
So there you are, two Metacrocks each now having parallel but not identical experiences of being in this room with the mad doctor who is, I dunno, laughing evilly or something.
Now the mad doctor decides to eliminate one of you. He does so with a disintegrator pistol and one metacrock instantly vanishes in a puff of dust.
Where there were two metacrock-experientialities, two metacrock viewpoints, now there is only one.
What happened to the experientiality, the subjective experience, the point of view, of the disintegrated metacrock? Did it instantly migrate into the remaining metacrock, so that he now has two points of view in one body? Or did it simply vanish?
If it simply vanished, then making a duplicate of someone does not cause a migration of "self", of subjective experientiality, whether or not the original is destroyed.
Let's say a mad scientist kidnaps you and runs you through a duplication machine. Now there are two of you. The subjective experience of the duplicate is identical to the first - the same memories, emotions, reactions - you find yourselves uttering the same words and phrases of shock and dismay as you look at each other.
The odd thing is, because you had to be unconscious during the duplication process, you and your duplicate are not sure which is the "original". And if it's an exact duplicate, does it even matter?
So there you are, two Metacrocks each now having parallel but not identical experiences of being in this room with the mad doctor who is, I dunno, laughing evilly or something.
Now the mad doctor decides to eliminate one of you. He does so with a disintegrator pistol and one metacrock instantly vanishes in a puff of dust.
Where there were two metacrock-experientialities, two metacrock viewpoints, now there is only one.
What happened to the experientiality, the subjective experience, the point of view, of the disintegrated metacrock? Did it instantly migrate into the remaining metacrock, so that he now has two points of view in one body? Or did it simply vanish?
If it simply vanished, then making a duplicate of someone does not cause a migration of "self", of subjective experientiality, whether or not the original is destroyed.
Re: we gotta get this thing kick started again.
The problem is, fleet, those who believe the self has some kind of indestructible core would just argue that the one Meta had not been destroyed, just transmogrified into some other kind of existence, while the other was still here - and still being transmogrified in perhaps subtler ways by his experiences here too. So, for them, there is no continuity problem.
The “One” is the space of the “world” of the tick, but also the “pinch” of the lobster, or that rendezvous in person to confirm online pictures (with a new lover or an old God). This is the machinery operative...as “onto-theology."
Dr Ward Blanton
Dr Ward Blanton
Re: we gotta get this thing kick started again.
Right, and my thought experiment shows why this view is wrong.met wrote:The problem is, fleet, those who believe the self has some kind of indestructible core would just argue that the one Meta had not been destroyed, just transmogrified into some other kind of existence, while the other was still here - and still being transmogrified in perhaps subtler ways by his experiences here too. So, for them, there is no continuity problem.
One of the hallmarks of freedom is that when you recognize someone is being intellectually dishonest or arguing with you in bad faith, you have the option to walk away without being punished, imprisoned or tortured.