Omnipotence and other Theological mistakes

[mdsimpson92]

he Mistakes Briefly Presented
I introduce, with a minimum of criticism or argument, six ideas about God which have been held by a great
number of learned and brilliant philosophers and theologians through many centuries and in many religious
traditions, but which I and many others, including some distinguished modern theologians and philosophers,
have found quite unacceptable. In other words, what we attack is an old tradition, but we attack it standing
within a somewhat newer tradition. In this newer tradition there is a partial appeal (with reservations) to still a
third tradition which is old indeed, expressed in various sacred writings, including the Old and New Testaments
of the Bible. For it is our contention that the ''theological mistakes" in question give the word God a meaning
which is not true to its import in sacred writings or in concrete religious piety. This result came about partly
because theologians in medieval Europe and the Near East were somewhat learned in Greek philosophy and
largely ignorant of any other philosophy. This happened in both Christianity and Islam, to a somewhat lesser
extent in Judaism. In all three religions there was a development of mysticism, which was different still and in
some ways partially corrective of the all-too-Greek form taken by the official theologies.
In section B, I develop at length my arguments against the six mistakes, which together form what I call classical
theism (the one too strongly influenced by Greek philosophy as medieval scholars knew that philosophy) and in
favor of what I sometimes call the
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new theism, sometimes process theology, sometimes neoclassical theismwhich is my version of a general point of
view that has had a good many proponents in recent times.
First Mistake: God Is Absolutely Perfect and Therefore Unchangeable. In Plato's Republic one finds the
proposition: God, being perfect, cannot change (not for the better, since "perfect" means that there can be no
better; not for the worse, since ability to change for the worse, to decay, degenerate, or become corrupt, is a
weakness, an imperfection). The argument may seem cogent, but it is so only if two assumptions are valid: that it
is possible to conceive of a meaning for "perfect" that excludes change in any and every respect and that we must
conceive God as perfect in just this sense. Obviously the ordinary meanings of perfect do not entirely exclude
change. Thus Wordsworth wrote of his wife that she was a ''perfect woman," but he certainly did not mean that
she was totally unchangeable. In many places in the Bible human beings are spoken of as perfect; again the entire
exclusion of change cannot have been intended. Where in the Bible God is spoken of as perfect, the indications
are that even here the exclusion of change in any and every respect was not implied. And where God is directly
spoken of as strictly unchanging ("without shadow of turning"), there is still a possibility of ambiguity. God might
be absolutely unchangeable in righteousness (which is what the context indicates is the intended meaning), but
changeable in ways compatible with, neutral to, or even required by, this unswerving constancy in righteousness.
Thus, God would be in no degree, however slight, alterable in the respect in question (the divine steadfastness in
good will) and yet alterable, not necessarily in spite of, but even because of, this steadfastness. If the creatures
behave according to God's will, God will appreciate this behavior; if not, God will have a different response,
equally appropriate and expressive of the divine goodness.
The Biblical writers were not discussing Greek philosophical issues, and it is at our own peril that we interpret
them as if they were discussing these, just as it is at our peril if we take them to be discussing various modern
issues that had not arisen in ancient Palestine. It may even turn out on inquiry that perfection, if taken to imply
an absolute maximum of value in every conceivable respect,
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does not make sense or is contradictory. In that case the argument of the Republic is an argument from an
absurdity and proves nothing. Logicians have found that abstract definitions may seem harmless and yet be
contradictory when their meanings are spelled out. Example, "the class of all classes." Similarly, "actuality of all
possible values," to which no addition is possible, may have contradictory implications. If perfection cannot
consistently mean this value maximum, then the Platonic argument is unsound. Nor was it necessarily Plato's
last word on the subject. (See Chapter 2B.)
Second Mistake: Omnipotence. God, being defined as perfect in all respects must, it seems, be perfect in power;
therefore, whatever happens is divinely made to happen. If I die of cancer this misfortune is God's doing. The
question then becomes,, "Why has God done this to me?" Here everything depends on "perfect in power" or
"omnipotent.'' And here, too, there are possible ambiguities, as we shall see.
Third Mistake: Omniscience. Since God is unchangeably perfect, whatever happens must be eternally known to
God. Our tomorrow's deeds, not yet decided upon by us, are yet always or eternally present to God, for whom
there is no open future. Otherwise (the argument goes), God would be "ignorant," imperfect in knowledge,
waiting to observe what we may do. Hence, whatever freedom of decision we may have must be somehow
reconciled with the alleged truth that our decisions bring about no additions to the divine life. Here perfect and
unchanging knowledge, free from ignorance or increase, are the key terms. It can be shown that they are all
seriously lacking in clarity, and that the theological tradition resolved the ambiguities in a question-begging way.
It is interesting that the idea of an unchangeable omniscience covering every detail of the world's history is not to
be found definitely stated in ancient Greek philosophy (unless in Stoicism, which denied human freedom) and is
rejected by Aristotle. It is not clearly affirmed in the Bible. It is inconspicuous in the philosophies of India, China,
and Japan. Like the idea of omnipotence, it is largely an invention of Western thought of the Dark or Middle
Ages. It still goes unchallenged in much current religious thought.
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But many courageous and competent thinkers have rejected it, including Schelling and Whitehead.
Fourth Mistake: God's Unsympathetic Goodness. God's "love" for us does not, for classical theists, mean that
God sympathizes with us, is rejoiced or made happy by our joy or good fortune or grieved by our sorrow or
misery. Rather God's love is like the sun's way of doing good, which benefits the myriad forms of life on earth but
receives no benefits from the good it produces. Nor does the sun lose anything by its activity (we now know that
this is bad astronomy). Or, God's beneficial activity is like that of an overflowing fountain that remains forever
full no matter how much water comes from it, and without receiving any from outside. Thus it is not human love,
even at its best, that was taken as the model for divine love but instead two inanimate phenomena of nature,
fictitiously conceived at that. Bad physics and astronomy, rather than sound psychology, were the sources of the
imagery.
In short, argument from an insufficiently analyzed notion of perfection and a preference for materialistic (and
prescientific) rather than truly spiritual conceptions were for almost two thousand years dominant in Western
theology.
Fifth Mistake: Immortality as a Career after Death. If our existence has any importance for God, or if God loves
us, He-She will notit was arguedallow death to turn us into mere corpses. Hence, many have concluded, a theist
must believe that we survive death in some form, and that the myths of heaven and hell have some truth in
them. Here the assumption is that a mere corpse on the one hand and on the other hand survival in a new mode
of heavenly or hellish existence (in which our individual consciousnesses will have new experiences not enjoyed
or suffered while on earth) are the only possibilities. There is, however, as we shall see, a third possibility, quite
compatible with God's love for us.
It is notable that in most of the Old Testament, for instance in the sublime Book of Job, individual immortality is
not even mentioned. To this day, religious Judaism is much more cautious about affirming, and it often denies,
such immortality. In the New Testament Jesus says little that seems to bear on the subject, and
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according to at least one very distinguished theologian (Reinhold Niebuhr), even that little is not decisive in
excluding the third possibility just mentioned.
Sixth Mistake: Revelation as Infallible. The idea of revelation is the idea of special knowledge of God, or of
religious truth, possessed by some people and transmitted by them to others. In some form or other the idea is
reasonable. In all other matters people differ in their degree of skill or insight. Why not in religion? In the various
sciences we acknowledge some people as experts and regard their opinions as of more value than those of the
rest of us. The notion that in religion there are no individuals whose insight is any clearer, deeper, or more
authentic than anyone else's is not particularly plausible. In all countries and in all historical times there have
been individuals to whom multitudes have looked for guidance in religion. Buddha, Lao Tse, Confucius, Moses,
Zoroaster, Shankara, Jesus, Muhammed, Joseph Smith, and Mary Baker Eddy were such individuals. New
examples are to be found within the lives of many of us. Pure democracy or sheer equalitarianism in religious
matters is not to be expected of our human nature. Some distinction between leaders or founders and followers
or disciples seems to be our destiny. But there is a question of degree, or of qualification. To what extent, or
under what conditions, are some individuals, or perhaps is some unique individual, worthy of trust in religious
matters? It is in the answer to this question that mistakes can be made. Only a few years ago such a mistake
sent hundreds to death, partly at their own hands, at Jonestown in British Guiana.
In religions that think of God as a conscious, purposive being, the idea of revelation can take a special form. Not
simply that some are abler, wiser, than others in religion, as individuals may be in a science or in politics, but that
divine wisdom has selected and so controlled a certain individual or set of individuals as to make them
transmitters of the very wisdom of God to humanity. Since God is infallible (can make no mistakes), if no
limitations are admitted to this conception of revelation, the distinction between fallible human beings and the
infallible God tends to disappear. And so we find letters to newspaper editors in which the writer claims that his
or her quotation from the Bible supporting some
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political position has the backing of "God almighty." Thus the essential principle of democracy, that none of us is
divinely wise, that we all may make mistakes, is compromised.
One defense of claims to revelation is the reported occurrence of miracles. The fact, however, is that in every
religion miracles are claimed. Hence the mere claim is not enough to establish the validity of the revelation.
Buddha is reported to have spoken as a newborn infant. Was Shotoku Taishi, ruler-saint of seventh century
Japan, shown to be of superordinary status by the fact that his death brought forth "rain from a cloudless sky"?
Unless one believes (or disbelieves) all such accounts, how does one know where to stop?

[Metacrock]

God is absolute perfection and thereby unchangeable?

The problem here is the concept of absolute perfection. I think God would more perfect than anything. Of course he wouldn't make mistakes or be at fault on anything. But then is that all that is meant by the term "perfection." I don't think it's a meaningful term. For example God can't make square circles becuase that's a contradiction in terms. So does that mean God is imperfect because there's something he can't do? Surely wouldn't count becuase it's undoable. So do we say that not being able to do the undoable makes God imperfect?

that's a glass half full kind of question.

why does perfection equal unchangeable? Why can't there be a form of perfection that is changeable? It seems it would be more perfect to change and still be without flaw than to be unchangeable. Nothing beging able to change would be a flaw. Perhaps it would perfect if God is malleable in a context that requires it such as in dealings with a changing universe.

I know this is unconventional thinking yet do I have a point or not?

[moksha]

God is absolute perfection and thereby unchangeable?

The problem here is the concept of absolute perfection. I think God would more perfect than anything. Of course he wouldn't make mistakes or be at fault on anything. But then is that all that is meant by the term "perfection." I don't think it's a meaningful term. For example God can't make square circles becuase that's a contradiction in terms. So does that mean God is imperfect because there's something he can't do? Surely wouldn't count becuase it's undoable. So do we say that not being able to do the undoable makes God imperfect?

that's a glass half full kind of question.

why does perfection equal unchangeable? Why can't there be a form of perfection that is changeable? It seems it would be more perfect to change and still be without flaw than to be unchangeable. Nothing beging able to change would be a flaw. Perhaps it would perfect if God is malleable in a context that requires it such as in dealings with a changing universe.

I know this is unconventional thinking yet do I have a point or not?

Why would God need to change?
Also isn't change dependent upon time?
If God is outside time then God wouldn't change.

[Metacrock]

Why would God need to change?
Also isn't change dependent upon time?
If God is outside time then God wouldn't change.

talking bout di polar God. process theology. Change with the evolving creation. process means God is moving into concrete existence and then self realization. Very Hegelian.

[moksha]

Why would God need to change?
Also isn't change dependent upon time?
If God is outside time then God wouldn't change.

talking bout di polar God. process theology. Change with the evolving creation. process means God is moving into concrete existence and then self realization. Very Hegelian.

Ohh.

[Metacrock]

Why would God need to change?
Also isn't change dependent upon time?
If God is outside time then God wouldn't change.

talking bout di polar God. process theology. Change with the evolving creation. process means God is moving into concrete existence and then self realization. Very Hegelian.

Ohh.

I'm just referring to a theological theory. I'm not a process theology guy myself.

[mdsimpson92]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1bXCm9O37uI

Just throwing this in.

[Metacrock]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1bXCm9O37uI

Just throwing this in.

we gotta do something to save the board.

[mdsimpson92]

Well, I can't help you to block those advertisements. Maybe one of the other guys knows how to.

[Metacrock]

Well, I can't help you to block those advertisements. Maybe one of the other guys knows how to.

Richard, the unseen benefactor who set up the board for me, and who has helped out from time to time, did something. Mike also came to the rescue.