against Physicalism

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against Physicalism

Post by Metacrock » Sat Mar 24, 2018 2:36 am

Physicalism is the ideology taking the place of naturalism,materialism, and other such assumptions. It is a metaphysical assumption but skeptics and atheists are treating it like the gospel.In this blog piece I will examine a couple of arguments I make about the contradictory nature of physicalism. I will point to some of the most accepted arguments against it but I will focus upon my own ideas. This is mainly because I have not yet read the book I'm oing to suggest you read.




Daniel Stoljar, in , The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), defines physicalism:

Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical. The thesis is usually intended as a metaphysical thesis, parallel to the thesis attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Thales, that everything is water, or the idealism of the 18th Century philosopher Berkeley, that everything is mental. The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the condition of being physical. Of course, physicalists don't deny that the world might contain many items that at first glance don't seem physical — items of a biological, or psychological, or moral, or social nature. But they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are either physical or supervene on the physical.[1]


Eric Sotnak says: "I'm open to the possibility that non-physical realities of some sort might exist. But physicalism has been really successful as a methodological assumption in the sciences."[2] That is really confusing the methodology with the underlying metaphysical assumptions. Most of what science has achieved in modernity was not achieved by people who assumed that "everything isphyiscal." Many of those discoveries were made by people like Newton, Boyle, Priestly, Maxwell, Faraday, who assumed that God is pure spirit and the basis upon which all physical reality exists. That a professional philosopher would say theism when I know he knows better, indicates the way physicalism as ideological propaganda has been put about.





People assume the metaphysics assumption is part of the whole thus part of the success of science. But really what else could science do? Science is only capable of dealing with empirical data, it can only find physical things. It can't deal with anything else so saying that the assumption of physicalism shares in the success of science is like saying we can safely rule out the existence of on non-matalic objects underground because metal deters are so successful at finding metal objects.



When we examine the concept of saying that reality is limited to just physical things we find confusion and contradiction. Take the definition of physical,. What does it mean to say a thing is physical? Let's consult Websters:



Definition of physical

: of or relating to natural scienceb (1) : of or relating to physics (2) : characterized or produced by the forces and operations of physics2a : having material existence : perceptible especially through the senses and subject to the laws of nature

everything physical is measurable by weight, motion, and resistance —Thomas De Quincey
: of or relating to material things3a : of or relating to the body

physical abuse
b (1) : concerned or preoccupied with the body and its needs : carnal

physical appetites
(2) : sexual

a physical love affair


physical attraction
c : characterized by especially rugged and forceful physical activity : rough

a physical hockey game


a physical player[3]

We can rule out b because it doesn't apply. Much in "a" is recursive. For example "of or relating to natural science b (1) : of or relating to physics " The physical is what we study in physics, and physics is abouit the physical. Very helpful. The most sensible thing we take from this definition is the line "having material existence. " Now we may be getting some place but there is a problem with material existence. We can't really say what it is. For example the dictionary expands upon material existence by saying "perceptible especially through the senses and subject to the laws of nature." Sub atomic particles are not perceptible through the senses and they don't seem subject to the laws of nature since they pop in and out of existence, Moreover if I could see a spirit and it obeyed certain natural laws would that make it material even though it would be a spirit?


Just as the term physical is ambiguous and can be tautological so the same can be said for the term "exists."

....n mathematics, we can meaningfully say that the complex numbers exist, but their properties are not physical properties. Thus, the statement "to exist is to have physical properties" is certainly not true in a mathematical context.Let us then refine the statement to read as follows: "to physically exist is to have physical properties." If we define physical properties to mean the properties of entities that physically exist, then the statement appears to be a tautology, and there is no sense in which it is not true.However, whether or not something physically exists or has certain physical properties depends on the context. For example, we can meaningfully say that intrinsic angular momentum of the electron (i.e., its spin) is a physical property of an electron in the context of quantum field theory. But no such property is But no such property is well-defined in the context of classical mechanics. [4]

It seems that if we examine the nature of these cases we almost have to invent a special category for non material existence. Complex numbers are one example, subatomic particles are another, Virtual particles don't have a real existence, the are not concrete or tangible and seem to "exist: only in so far as the perimeters of quantum theory makes them plausible.[5][6]



It's not enough to criticize concepts of the physical. physicalists couch their support for the doctrine in terms of a default status,since as they allege they can;t find a good reason to accept non physical existence, "Physicalism is a view generally adopted by default. Few people go through the arguments for and against the view. As it turns out, the arguments in favor of physicalism are not very persuasive."[7] As Sotnak puts it, "Show me compelling evidence for non-physical realities and give me a compelling account of how they should be integrated into the rest of science and I'm willing to listen.."[8]



I find the arguments that mind is not replaceable to brain to be compelling to suspect that there might be some form of non physical reality. I have traced those arguments at length in a two part series posted last week on this blog. [9]I wont go over all of that again sine it was posted so recently, That in itself is a good reason but there is more to it than that. The physicalists are dealing with mind in the from of "mental states," at least Sotnak is at any rate: "So to return to the original claim of your two posts (that there can be brainless minds): I have yet to see any compelling reasons for me to think that there are any mental states that have no physical basis at all."[Ibid].



I do not argue that our own mental states have no physical basis at all I have no problem handling the Supervenience of mind upon the physical even granting my religions faith because Supervenience is not synonymous with reduction of mind to brain. I don't know of anyone else who argues that human metal states have no psychical basis at all. The problem is we are not merely dealing with our own mental states. At the back of his topic,indeed what set off the discussion in the first place,is the notion of God as the bassos of mind.
























1917 defense of dualism

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2940172?seq ... b_contents





If mind is non-physical it does. I thin the whole problem with physicilism is that physical is not nailed down as securely as those who support that view think it is. There are unclear sects to the notion of physical.



The problem there is your talking about "mental states." I am talking about universal mind, (God) which would be the ground of all mid.So obviously there going to be different sets of expectations that would govern an understanding of each. In other words, humans have mental states, they don't have universal ind,God is aware of all mental states but being universal mind he is not subject to any of them.So obviously there's an explanatory gap there. You have to look for a different set of clues.





God and the new physics









https://philosophicalapologist.com/2016 ... ysicalism/





https://www.amazon.com/Minds-Causes-Mec ... 0631218017











https://www.iep.utm.edu/know-arg/


https://philosophicalapologist.com/2016 ... ysicalism/















[1]Daniel Stoljar,"Physicalism",The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win ... hysicalism

(accessed 3/22/2018)


[2] Eric Sotnak , Comment Section, Metacrock's Blog


[3] Physical, Webseters online



[4] https://www.quora.com/To-exist-is-to-ha ... t-NOT-true (accessed 3/22/2018)
[5] VPs


[6]

https://physics.stackexchange.com/quest ... s-a-photon


[7] https://philosophicalapologist.com/2016 ... ysicalism/


[8] Sotnak Op Cit
[9] Joseph Hinman, "Mind is not reducible to brain, pat 1. Metacrock's Blog
part 2 posted March 20, 2018
Have Theology, Will argue: wire Metacrock
Buy My book: The Trace of God: Warrant for belief

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Re: against Physicalism

Post by QuantumTroll » Sat Mar 24, 2018 3:38 pm

Howdy, I guess I'm back for a little bit this spring. It's been a while.

If I'm reading you correctly, in this post you're starting with the theory that a (or the) universal mind underlies all minds. And since the universal mind is nonphysical, this means minds aren't physical. So physicalism as a metaphysical thesis can't be right. Is that correct?

In my mind, this is strangely backwards.

I intend to prove that physicalism is true using an inductive proof.

1. Axiom 1: Physics is correct and physical objects obey physical laws. An object at rest stays at rest unless acted upon by a physical force, and physical forces are caused by physical objects.
2. Axiom 2: My body is physical.
3. A1+A2 implies my body would stay at rest unless acted upon by a physical force.
4. Observation: I can make my body move.
5. This implies I can cause a physical force to act upon my body.
6. Together with A1 this implies that a physical object causes my body to move.
7. Either I am the physical object in (6) or I can affect the physical object in (6).
8. By logical induction, (7) implies that I'm a physical object or force.

If you accept that even purely mental processes have a physical component, e.g. signals propagating through the brain, then it's clear that whatever identifies itself as I is a physical thing. I don't see how a non-physical mind comes into the process of thinking and existing, at least not in a meaningful way.

Let's explore this nonphysical universal mind a little bit. What is it? Well, what is a mind? A mind is something that thinks and experiences. A universal mind? A universal mind would, by definition, be engaged in universal thought and universal experience. Okay, in order then.

1. What is thinking? Thinking is a form of processing information. I won't say that all information processing is thinking, but I do believe that all thinking is information processing. Before you've thought, you have one set of information. After you've thought, you have a different set of information (a new idea, another perspective, a different emotion, what have you). Information has changed. We have uncontrovertibly physical things that can change information. Thinking can be a physical process. We have a mathematics and a science that describes this process. That which underlies all thought would then be something like the logical axioms that form the mathematical underpinnings of computation itself — not a mind or something capable of thinking in itself, and also not something physical.

2. What is experiencing? This is more difficult to deal with, but we can split the phenomenon into two parts. There's an information processing step where sensory information or thought is taken in. Something is done with this information that makes it an experience. Now I feel a desire to return to the "inductive proof" above and argue that something as physical as information will be subject to physical laws and therefore be subject to physical processes, but I'd like to avoid that argument here. Let's stay agnostic and say that experience may or may not be nonphysical, but on the other hand, experience without anything to be experienced (sensory input or thought) is meaningless.

The result of this investigation is this: the nonphysical something that underlies all mind (thought and experience) isn't a mind in itself. Thinking is physical and involves changes in information. Experience requires thinking or senses.

I know I'm a rube, but God, to me, isn't a set of equations or a mundane truth about where in transcendence our experiences take place. That's basically a form of non-theistic Buddhism. I think arguments of this sort shouldn't be labeled as being about God. It's about metaphysics. I always feel disappointed when it turns out that God is something that could be described in a college textbook. I'd be fine with a theory of God where He is physical, or a theory of an unphysical God where you don't flatten Him out into something mundane.

If you see a need for an actual universal mind to explain some experiences in your life, then I can't exactly disprove that or even argue against it (well, I could argue against a literally universal mind and for a more local phenomenon occurring between living people), but that's not the focus of your argument here.

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Re: against Physicalism

Post by Jim B. » Sun Mar 25, 2018 2:22 pm

Great to see you back and new posting on here again!

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Re: against Physicalism

Post by Jim B. » Mon Mar 26, 2018 3:59 am

If you accept that even purely mental processes have a physical component, e.g. signals propagating through the brain, then it's clear that whatever identifies itself as I is a physical thing. I don't see how a non-physical mind comes into the process of thinking and existing, at least not in a meaningful way.

What about the idea of the conscious mind as an emergent property or set of properties with its own ontology and novel causal powers? Or some kind of neutral monism idea like Spinoza and Bertrand Russell (briefly) considered, that the basic "stuff" of the universe is neither mental nor physical but something neutral that encompasses both things and that each thing is an aspect or projection of?

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Re: against Physicalism

Post by met » Mon Mar 26, 2018 6:15 pm

.
I know I'm a rube, but God, to me, isn't a set of equations or a mundane truth about where in transcendence our experiences take place. That's basically a form of non-theistic Buddhism. I think arguments of this sort shouldn't be labeled as being about God. It's about metaphysics. I always feel disappointed when it turns out that God is something that could be described in a college textbook. I'd be fine with a theory of God where He is physical, or a theory of an unphysical God where you don't flatten Him out into something mundane.
Hi QT! :) Really interesting thing you said...
The “One” is the space of the “world” of the tick, but also the “pinch” of the lobster, or that rendezvous in person to confirm online pictures (with a new lover or an old God). This is the machinery operative...as “onto-theology."
Dr Ward Blanton

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Re: against Physicalism

Post by QuantumTroll » Tue Mar 27, 2018 5:05 am

Jim B. wrote:
Mon Mar 26, 2018 3:59 am
If you accept that even purely mental processes have a physical component, e.g. signals propagating through the brain, then it's clear that whatever identifies itself as I is a physical thing. I don't see how a non-physical mind comes into the process of thinking and existing, at least not in a meaningful way.

What about the idea of the conscious mind as an emergent property or set of properties with its own ontology and novel causal powers? Or some kind of neutral monism idea like Spinoza and Bertrand Russell (briefly) considered, that the basic "stuff" of the universe is neither mental nor physical but something neutral that encompasses both things and that each thing is an aspect or projection of?
I'm definitely on board with the idea that the mind is an emergent phenomenon, and that emergent "things" can exert "top-down" causation. Maybe you recall my example of a bird flock, which I've used several times on this board. The flock is "merely" a product of the relationships between individual birds, yet has a distinct behaviour of its own. I don't think this means a bird flock is not a physical object, because if you take away the physical then there is literally nothing left (the relationships disappear as well, you see).

In fact:

Everything physical in the universe is fundamentally a set of interactions between other things. A photon can't be (or is never) emitted in a direction where it won't be absorbed, which means that a photon is a relationship between two charged particles. Even something as solid and real as an electron can't be said to exist unless it e.g. emits a (possibly virtual) photon that affects something else. A proton is a complex configuration of quarks and gluons, like a flock of subatomic particles, and we certainly consider protons to be physical objects.

So if everything physical can be described as a relationship between other things, then complex phenomena that is emergent from physical can reasonably be considered no less physical. Or nothing is physical. Or physical is just a word that describes some things, and non-physical is a word that describes things that are slightly less directly obvious.

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Re: against Physicalism

Post by QuantumTroll » Tue Mar 27, 2018 5:07 am

Also, thanks for the welcome, guys :)

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Re: against Physicalism

Post by Jim B. » Tue Mar 27, 2018 1:55 pm

Good response, QT. Just a couple of remarks:

Even if a flock's behavior is impossible without the physical stuff that comprises it doesn't necessarily mean that the physical stuff is sufficient for understanding the flock's behavior. I couldn't be having these thoughts and experiences I'm currently having (probably) without a brain/nervous system, but my experiences are something other than my brain. It's the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions.

You're right that everything physical is understood in terms of its relations to other things. The physical world is a web of relations. A problem comes with experiences, however, which are defined intrinsically rather than extrinscally. I agree that there are extrinsic things about them, but their essential quality is its intrinsic properties, ie qualia and the like.

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Re: against Physicalism

Post by QuantumTroll » Wed Mar 28, 2018 5:27 am

Jim B. wrote:
Tue Mar 27, 2018 1:55 pm
Good response, QT. Just a couple of remarks:

Even if a flock's behavior is impossible without the physical stuff that comprises it doesn't necessarily mean that the physical stuff is sufficient for understanding the flock's behavior. I couldn't be having these thoughts and experiences I'm currently having (probably) without a brain/nervous system, but my experiences are something other than my brain. It's the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions.
Are your experiences something other than your brain, though? This is basically the p-zombie question, unless I misunderstood you.

I propose that your living brain, undergoing the changes and processes that it does, must produce your experiences. Suppose we remove the unphysical "stuff" that you think is (also) necessary. If this p-zombie brain lacks the property of conscious experience, then the p-zombie fingers would never type "I'm experiencing these qualia", which is a physical difference. This means your p-zombie brain, defined as physically identical to your ordinary brain, is functioning in a physically different way from your ordinary brain. Unless physics is somehow not consistent inside human brains, this is a contradiction and the premise must be false, i.e. there is no unphysical stuff and p-zombies are impossible.
You're right that everything physical is understood in terms of its relations to other things. The physical world is a web of relations. A problem comes with experiences, however, which are defined intrinsically rather than extrinscally. I agree that there are extrinsic things about them, but their essential quality is its intrinsic properties, ie qualia and the like.
I believe that the intrinsic and the extrinsic are just two sides of the same coin, and you can't have the extrinsic without the intrinsic. That does imply that a bird flock has its own mind, as real as and possibly as complex as an insect's or ant-hive's. There is no p-zombie bird flock.

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